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1.0 Introduction 
Several accounts of legislative behavior in American politics have been made, 
reflecting the complexity of American legislative politics. In disciplined two-party 
systems, such as Great Britain, the majority party proposes legislation. The legislation 
is routinely approved by all members of the majority and opposed by all members of 
the minority. In the United States, such a model is not applicable (Poole and Rosenthal 
1997: 1). In U.S. legislatures, the policy outcomes reflect not only the preferences of 
the legislators themselves, but the pressures and appeals of staff members, lobbyists, 
and constituents (Poole and Rosenthal 1997: 1).  
 
Ideology is found to be the superior predictor of legislative behavior (Feld and 
Grofman 1988; Poole 1981; Poole and Rosenthal 1991; Poole and Rosenthal 1997), 
but other factors such as political ambition, may also have predictive capacity. 
Theories of legislative politics with a political ambition component are commonly 
referred to as ambition theories and are usually traced to Joseph Schlesinger (1966). 
The central assumption of Schlesinger’s ambition theory is that “a politician ‘s 
behavior is a response to his office goals”. Moreover, “the politician as office seeker 
engages in political acts and makes decisions appropriate to gaining office.” And 
finally, “our ambitious politician must act today in terms of the electorate of the office 
which he hopes to win tomorrow” (Schlesinger 1966: 6). 
 
Relatively few studies have sought to ascertain whether these assumptions are true. 
Moreover, existing studies have produced mixed results (Lubalin 1981; Hibbing 1986; 
Herrick and Moore 1993; Francis and Kenny 1996; Herrick 2001). Therefore, this 
study aims to explore whether an ambition-based approach to politics can contribute to 
the understanding of legislative behavior.  More specifically, the study examines the 
effect of ambition on United States senators who ran for president from 1976 to 2004. 
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One approach to assessing whether ambition theory may explain legislative behavior is 
to compare ambitious politicians to their colleagues to see if their legislative behavior 
differs from that of other politicians in a predictable manner. Given the assumptions of 
ambition theory, senators running for president can be expected to alter their behavior 
as they approach a bid for the Presidency. By using measures of legislative behavior, 
such as attendance and roll call voting, it is possible to assess whether this is in fact the 
case. Consequently, the research question of this thesis is:  
Do senators running for president alter their behavior as Election Day 
approaches more than other senators? 
 
In sum, I have stated that several accounts of legislative behavior in the United States’ 
Congress have been made, and that ideology is said to be the superior predictor of 
legislative behavior, but that political ambition may also have predictive capacity. In 
the next section, I explain how I define and measure the core concepts of the 
analysis—political ambition and legislative behavior.   
 
1.1 Political Ambition 
Today, in everyday language, ‘ambition’ is defined as a desire for rank, fame, or 
power. Earlier definitions were more explicitly political. It comes from the Latin 
ambitio, which means canvassing, or personal solicitation of honors (Schlesinger 
1966: 1). In this study, I use the word ‘ambition’ in the explicitly political sense—
meaning the desire for an office. According to Schlesinger, ambition can be classified 
into three categories: (1) discrete ambition, meaning “the politician desires an office 
for its specified term and then chooses to withdraw from public office”; (2) static 
ambition, meaning “the politician seeks to make a long-run career out of a particular 
office”; and (3) progressive ambition, meaning “the politician aspires to attain an 
office more important than the one he now seeks or is holding” (Schlesinger 1966: 10). 
Being primarily concerned with presidential ambition in the Senate, I focus on 
category three—progressive ambition.  
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As pointed out John R. Hibbing (1989: 28), “[s]ystematic examination of ambition is 
problematic because ambition is best thought of as a psychological predisposition.” 
One approach to measuring ambition assumes that everyone who seeks a higher office 
has progressive ambition while those who remain in their current office without 
moving on to another have static ambition (Herrick and Moore 1993: 766). 
Progressive ambition may be possessed by many who never actually run for higher 
office. However,  
 
classifying some members who may have higher office ambition as having static 
ambition minimizes the observable differences between the classifications and makes for 
a conservative test of the hypothesis that ambition for higher offices yields a pattern of 
distinctive behavior (Herrick and Moore 1993: 766).  
 
Rebekah Herrick (2001: 470) argues that this approach is flawed. According to her, 
instead of examining the effects of members’ ambition, this approach tests whether 
those who run for higher office have unique legislative styles. She argues that the flaw 
is two-fold. First, the independent variable occurs after the dependent variables. 
Instead of testing whether ambition affects behavior, this approach tests whether 
members with certain legislative styles are more apt to seek higher offices. Second, as 
mentioned above, this approach is likely to underestimate ambition as members may 
want to advance but never have the opportunity.  
 
Herrick (2001: 470-471) suggests an alternative approach to measuring ambition—
measuring ambition as expressed desires. To do so, she surveyed non-incumbent 
candidates running in the 1992-94 House elections. Whereas this approach does not 
have to rely solely on assumptions, it has two obvious weaknesses, to which Herrick 
herself points. First, candidates may not be forthright in their responses about their 
political ambition, and second, members’ ambition may change after they are in office.    
 
In this study, I use the former approach—assuming that everyone who seeks a higher 
office has progressive ambition. Because some might question this choice, I stress that 
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I use the actual decision to seek a higher office as a surrogate for a member’s 
psychological predisposition to seek it, which is assumed to exist prior to their 
legislative activity (Herrick and Moore 1993: 772). Moreover, I recognize the 
limitations of the approach and interpret the findings accordingly. 
 
1.2 Legislative Behavior 
In this study, the term ‘legislative behavior’ refers to how the senators vote in the 
Senate. Two measures of legislative behavior are used, attendance and roll call 
voting1
1.2.1 Attendance 
. These activities are chosen because of their logical relationship to presidential 
contesting, and because they are quantifiable and retrievable from public records. 
 
Defining ‘attendance’ is difficult when analyzing U.S. Senators’ behavior. Senatorial 
duties take members to the chamber to vote, to committee hearings, to meetings with 
staff, as well as activities in a senator’s home state--to name just a few. However, one 
approach to measuring attendance is to look at the senators’ percentage of missed roll 
call votes.  The percentage of missed roll call votes will not give an accurate account 
of attendance, as a senator may have missed votes due to other senatorial 
responsibilities such as committee work, but serves as an adequate proxy. Hence, in 
this study, attendance is measured as the senators’ percentage of missed roll call votes. 
  
1.2.2. Roll Call Voting 
To describe voting positions political scientists have generally relied upon the concept 
of political ideology. As pointed out by Marshall H. Madoff (1997: 146), “[p]olitical 
ideology is one of the most frequently used concepts in the social sciences, yet has a 
variety of meanings.” He presents the following summary: 
 
                                              
 
1 A roll call vote is a vote on the record, noting the name of each senator and his/her voting position. 
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Downs (1957) defines political ideology as a platform or set of positions on issues that 
individuals adopt in seeking political office. Bluhm (1974) contends that political 
ideology is a philosophy about the goals of public policy and the means by which these 
policies are implemented. Jackson and Kingdon (1992) assert that political ideology is a 
set of core beliefs that organize perceptions of political issues and that underlie individual 
preferences. Kalt and Zupan (1984) suggest that political ideology is a statement about 
how government can best serve their proponents' conceptions of the public interest 
(Madoff 1997: 146).   
 
In this study, however, I use ‘ideology’ in the sense intended by Philip E. Converse 
(1964)—that an ideology is a belief system or a configuration of ideas and attitudes in 
which the elements are bound together by some constraint, meaning that a particular 
belief is predictive of another belief, and that this predictive power holds true across a 
wide set of issues. 
 
One way to think about the continuum of ideological positions is in terms of a 
spectrum that ranges from the left to the right, from very liberal to moderate to very 
conservative (Poole and Rosenthal 1997: 4). In American politics, liberals generally 
view government as a regulator in the public interest, favor higher taxes for the rich, 
and favor spending more on the poor. They generally believe the government should 
spend less on the military and are less willing to commit troops to action. Liberals are 
also more likely to support legal abortion, oppose prayer in school, and favor 
affirmative action. Conservatives, on the other hand, generally favor free-market 
solutions, low taxes, and low spending on the poor, emphasizing instead aid to the 
poor by religious and secular charities. They generally believe the government should 
maintain peace through strength and are more likely to support military intervention 
around the world. Conservatives are also more likely to oppose legal abortion, support 
prayer in school, and oppose affirmative action (Edwards III et al 2002: 192). This 
summary, of course, is oversimplified. However, it provides a basic understanding of 
the key differences between the liberal and the conservative camps in contemporary 
American politics. 
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Among Americans and students of American politics, the liberal-conservative 
spectrum is a “perceived reality” (Poole and Rosenthal 1997: 4-5). In other words, a 
large percentage of the American public would probably agree that members of 
Congress can be thought of as occupying a position on the liberal-conservative 
spectrum. Edward “Ted” Kennedy would be labeled a liberal, Dianne Feinstein a more 
moderate Democrat, Joe Lieberman even more so. On the other end of the spectrum, 
Olympia Snow would be labeled a more moderate Republican, while Rick Santorum a 
conservative Republican (MaCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006: 3). 
 
Nevertheless, to make ideological positions amenable to quantitative analysis, they 
must be given an operational definition. As indicated at the beginning of this section, 
this study links ideological positions with voting positions (or more precisely, voting 
positions with ideological positions). To measure voting positions of members of the 
US Congress, scholars have customarily relied upon interest group ratings which are 
derived from congressional roll call votes. However, many such ratings have no 
confidence intervals for the reported scores (Clinton et al 2004b: 2), and given that 
they are produced by interest groups there is a possibility of bias. Therefore, in this 
study, I use ideal points.  
 
An ideal point is a measure of the legislators’ legislative preference, estimated from 
their voting records, using all recorded votes in a given Congress. Clinton et al (2004: 
355) explains the appeal and importance of ideal point estimation in the following 
way: 
 
First, ideal point estimates let us describe legislators and legislatures. The distribution of 
ideal point estimates reveals how cleavages between legislators reflect partisan affiliation 
or region or become more polarized over time (e.g. McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal 
2001). Second, estimates from roll call analysis can be used to test theories of legislative 
behavior. For instance, roll call analysis has been used in studies of the U.S. Congress, 
both contemporary and historical, state legislatures, courts, comparative politics, and 
international relations. In short, roll call analysis makes conjectures about legislative 
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behavior amenable to quantitative analysis, helping make the study of legislative politics 
an empirically grounded, cumulative body of scientific knowledge (Clinton, Jackman, 
and Rivers 2004: 355). 
 
There are several procedures of estimating ideal points.2
To sum up, this study seeks to determine to what extent political ambition affects 
legislative behavior, or more precisely, to what extent senators who run for president 
alter their legislative behavior. To do so, this study employs two measures of 
legislative behavior, attendance and roll call voting. The main hypothesis is that 
political ambition does affect legislative behavior, that senators who run for president 
do alter their legislative behavior more than those members who are running for 
 I use the procedure developed 
by political scientists Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal—NOMINATE, Nominal 
Three-step Estimation. In short, to locate a politician’s voting position, this procedure 
uses information on who votes with whom and how often (MaCarty et al 2006: 5). For 
example, if legislator A votes with legislators B and C much more frequently than 
legislators B and C vote together, then NOMINATE positions legislator A as 
moderate, in between legislator B and C. Poole and Rosenthal show that this algorithm 
allows for quite precise measures of politicians’ positions on the on the liberal-
conservative continuum (MaCarty et al 2006:5). 
 
The NOMINATE scores range from -1 to +1, from most liberal to most conservative, 
or vice versa, depending on which legislator is chosen as “polarity” (i.e. the “pole” 
determining how the other Senators are ordered). In other words, if one of the most 
conservative legislators is chosen as “polarity”, then a score of -1 equals most liberal. 
If one of the most liberal legislators is chosen as “polarity”, then a score of -1 equals 
most conservative. In chapter 3, I go into detail about how the NOMINATE scores are 
estimated.  
 
                                              
 
2 See Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) for an account of Bayesian methods for ideal point estimation and 
Heckman and Snyder (1997) for an account of the factor-analytic approach to estimating ideal points. 
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reelection to the Senate. The basis for this hypothesis is found in ambition theory, to 
which I turn in Chapter 2.  
 
1.3 Literature Review 
As mentioned in the introduction, relatively few studies look at the ambition-behavior 
relationship. The effect of higher ambition on behavior has not been totally ignored, 
but it does seem safe to say that ambition theory has not represented a dominant, or 
even major, stream of either thought or research in the political science literature. Prior 
to Schlesinger’s work on ambition and behavior in the United States Congress, it did 
not even exist as an explicit theoretical position (Lubalin 1981: 2). According to 
ambition theorists, ambition has the potential for significantly affecting the substance 
of public policy. The ever-increasing literature on Congressional voting, therefore, 
does not seem to pay sufficient attention to perhaps the most fundamental factor of all-
-ambition. More research on the ambition-behavior relationship is thus called for. 
 
Existing studies of the ambition-behavior relationship have produced mixed results. 
Eve Lubalin (1981), John R. Hibbing (1986), Rebekah Herrick and Michael K. Moore 
(1993), Wayne L. Francis and Lawrence W. Kenny (1996), and Herrick (2001) all find 
evidence of alteration in behavior by politicians seeking a higher office but differ in 
terms of the extent to which these politicians alter behavior. This lack of agreement 
suggests a need to further explore the topic.         
 
Very few such studies, moreover, look at the ambition-behavior relationship in the 
Senate context. In the majority of the studies reviewed, ambition theory has been 
applied to the House of Representatives, and the aim has been to determine the extent 
to which ambition affects the behavior of Representatives who seek a seat in the 
Senate (Hibbing 1986; Herrick and Moore 1993; Francis and Kenny 1996; and Herrick 
2001). Given one of the most important findings in Ambition and Politics (for 
purposes of this study), the indication that the ramifications of ambition are most 
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pronounced at the highest level of the political system, more research on presidential 
ambition in the Senate is called for. 
 
The studies that look at the ambition-behavior relationship in the Senate context are 
old. For instance, Jack Van der Silk and Samuel Pernaciarrio’s study of senators with 
presidential or party leadership ambition dates back to 1979. Eve Lubalin’s 
dissertation on presidential ambition and senatorial behavior dates back to 1981. Given 
changes in American politics the past thirty years, these studies may be outdated. At 
the very least, an up-to-date analysis is needed. More specifically, the polarization in 
American politics the past 20-30 years has changed the context within which the 
possible effect of ambition on behavior takes place and should therefore be taken into 
consideration when studying the ambition-behavior relationship.    
 
None of the studies, to the author’s knowledge, analyze the ambition-behavior 
relationship in the Senate context by using NOMINATE scores. This is what the 
research reported here does. To evaluate ambition theory, this study applies it to the 
Senate and employs NOMINATE scores to determine the extent to which ambition 
affects behavior or more precisely, the extent to which senators running for president 
alter their legislative behavior.    
 
1.4 The Nomination Process 
The nomination process is an important part of the context within which the effect of 
presidential ambition on senatorial behavior is expected to occur, and should therefore, 
along with some important features, be highlighted at the outset. 
 
1.4.1 The Nomination Process 
The contemporary nomination process consists of two major parts: a series of caucuses 
and presidential primary elections held in each state, and the national party 
conventions held by each party. A caucus is a meeting of all state party leaders for 
selecting delegates to the national party convention whereas a presidential primary 
15 
 
 
election (often just called a primary) is a state election in which voters vote for a 
candidate (or for delegates pledged to him or her). Whether to hold a primary is the 
states’ decision. Some states only hold primaries, some only hold caucuses, and some 
hold both. These primaries and caucuses take place from January through June in the 
election year, with New Hampshire and Iowa traditionally holding the first primary 
and caucus, respectively. The national party convention is the supreme power within 
each of the parties3
                                              
 
3 Some might attack the accuracy of this statement. 
. At the convention, the selected or elected delegates officially 
nominate the party’s presidential and vice-presidential candidates and write the party’s 
platform. The conventions are usually held during the summer before the federal 
election (Edwards III et al 2002: 267-268). 
 
The Caucus Road to the National Party Convention 
Before primaries existed, all state parties selected their delegates to the national 
convention via caucuses. Sometimes one or two state party bosses ran the caucus 
show. Such state party leaders could control who went to the convention and how the 
state’s delegates voted once they got there. They were in many ways the “kingmakers” 
of presidential politics (Edwards III et al 2002: 267). 
 
Today’s caucuses are different. In the dozen states still holding them, caucuses are 
now open to all voters registered with the party. Caucuses are usually organized like a 
pyramid: At first, small, neighborhood, precinct-level caucuses are held. At this level, 
delegates are chosen, based on their preference for a certain candidate, to attend 
county and then congressional district caucuses, where delegates are chosen for the 
next level--a state convention. At the state convention, which usually occurs months 
after the precinct caucuses, delegates are finally chosen to go to the national 
convention (Edwards III et al 2002: 267). 
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Since 1972, Iowa has held the nation’s first caucuses. Because the Iowa caucuses are 
the first test of the candidates’ vote-getting ability, they usually get a lot of media 
attention. Well-known candidates like Senator John Glenn in 1984 and Senator Phil 
Gramm in 1996 saw their campaigns virtually fall apart because of poor showings in 
Iowa. Most importantly, candidates who were not thought to be contenders have 
received tremendous boosts from unexpectedly strong showings in Iowa. Former 
presidents Jimmy Carter and George Bush (41) made their first big step onto the 
national scene by winning in Iowa in 1976 and 1980, respectively. In fact, the Iowa 
caucuses have become so important that Iowans can expect at least one presidential 
candidate to come through the state weekly during the year preceding the caucuses 
(Edwards III et al 2002: 267). 
 
The Primary Road to the Party Convention 
The presidential primary was promoted around the turn of the 20th century by 
reformers wanting to take the nominating process out of party bosses’ hands. The 
reformers wanted to let the people vote in primaries for candidates who delegates to 
the national conventions would finally vote on. In 1912, the first presidential primaries 
were held in 13 states. Today, most delegates to the Democratic and Republican 
national conventions are selected via primaries (Edwards III et al 2002: 268). 
 
The primary season begins in January in New Hampshire. Like the Iowa caucuses, the 
importance of New Hampshire is not in the number of delegates or in how 
representative the state is, but rather that it is traditionally the first primary. At this 
early stage, the campaign is not about winning delegates, but about image--candidates 
want the rest of the country to see them as front-runners. The frenzy of political 
activity in this small state is given a lot of attention in the national press. In fact, in 
1996, 22 percent of TV coverage of the nomination process was devoted to the New 
Hampshire primary (Edwards III et al 2002: 270). 
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State laws determine how the delegates are allocated, but they operate within the 
general guidelines set by the parties. The Democratic Party requires all states to use 
some form of proportional representation whereby a candidate getting 15 percent or 
more of a state’s votes is awarded a roughly proportional share of the delegates. The 
Republican Party gives states a large degree of discretion. Some states, like California, 
allocate all Republican delegates to whomever wins the most votes; others, like Texas, 
award delegates according to who wins each congressional district, and yet others 
employ some form of proportional representation (Edwards III et al 2002: 271). 
 
The primaries serve as elimination contests, as the media continually monitor the 
number of delegates each candidate wins. Candidates who fail to score early wins are 
labeled as losers and typically drop. Usually they have little choice since early losses 
quickly inhibit a candidate’s ability to raise money necessary to campaign in other 
states. As one veteran fundraiser put it, “People don’t lose campaigns. They run out of 
money and can’t get their planes in the air. That’s the reality” (Edwards III et al 2002: 
271). 
 
By party convention time, the winner is usually known. The last time there was any 
doubt about who would win at the convention was in 1976, when Ford won the 
Republican nomination over Reagan. Both parties have also learned that it is not in 
their best interest to provide high drama. The Republican convention in 1964 and the 
Democratic conventions in 1968 and 1972 captured the public’s attention, but they 
also exposed such divisiveness that the parties were unable to unite for the fall 
campaign (Edwards III et al 2002: 273-274). 
 
Key Features of the Contemporary Nomination Process and their Consequences   
Participation in primaries and caucuses is low and unrepresentative (Edwards III and 
Wayne 2006: 31-32). About 50 percent of the population votes in the November 
presidential election, but only about 20 percent votes in presidential primaries. 
Participation in caucus states is even smaller because a person must usually devote 
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several hours to attending a caucus. Except in Iowa, where the extraordinary media 
attention usually boosts participation, only about 5 percent of registered voters 
typically attend caucuses (Edwards III et al 2002: 272).  
 
The low turnout rate in the primaries matters. An analysis of data from the 2006 
Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) indicates a high level of 
ideological constraint among voters in 2006 with a much lower level of constraint 
among nonvoters (Abramowitz 2007). Consequently, the low turnout rate in the 
primaries gives party activists and the groups they represent greater influence on the 
nominations. Because party activists exercise a disproportionate influence on 
nomination campaigns, the delegates have also been more likely to reflect the 
activists’ attitudinal preferences, which tend to be more ideological than those of other 
partisans. Democratic delegates tend to be more liberal and Republican delegates tend 
to be more conservative than their respective rank-and-file partisans are (Edwards III 
and Wayne 2006: 32). 
 
Another important feature of the contemporary nomination process is the importance 
of interest groups. Since the 1970s, powerful interest groups have gained considerable 
leverage. Edwards III and Wayne (2006: 32) argue that not only are candidates more 
beholden to these groups for their contributions, grassroots support, and public 
relations campaigns, but also they are forced to take positions that the groups support, 
positions that may limit their appeal in the general election.  
 
In an attempt to combat this development, a string of new finance laws were enacted in 
the 1970s. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), enacted in 1974, provided for 
public disclosure, contribution ceilings, campaign spending limits, and federal 
subsidies. New legislation enacted in 1976, and amended in 1979, provided for public 
disclosure of all contributions and expenditures over a certain amount (today $200), 
limits on individual and group contributions to candidates, federal subsidies for the 
nomination process, and grants for the federal election. Despite the continuous effort 
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toward limiting the disproportionate leverage of some due to contributions, however, 
Congress has only partly succeeded (Edwards III and Wayne 2006: 34).  
 
Other important features of the contemporary nomination process are the size and 
significance of the nomination process’s public dimension and the use of new 
communication channels. These confront aspiring presidential candidates with a host 
of challenges. First, today’s candidates must be willing to campaign continuously in 
the public eye through the mass media (primarily on radio and television, but 
increasingly also through the Internet). Second, they need to be well versed on many 
issues, with relatively well-defined messages that generate strong appeal within the 
party’s electoral coalition. Third, while appealing to the party’s electoral coalition, 
candidates must also try to avoid alienating other partisans whose support is necessary 
in the general election (Edwards and Wayne 2006: 38). 
 
To sum up, the contemporary nomination process generates some obvious demands. 
Candidates need to raise sufficient funds to mount an effective primary effort. They 
need to cultivate the national news media. They need to court party leaders and 
political activists in key states to pull together a grassroots organization for primary 
and caucus contests. They need to increase their national name recognition so as to 
look good in the polls. They need to build a public record to sell themselves to 
potential supporters and answer the inevitable question with which candidates are 
faced: “Why you?” (Lubalin 1981: 77)  
 
Once nominated, candidates concentrate on campaigning for the general election--an 
endeavor at least as arduous as the nomination struggle. Directed toward a larger and 
more heterogeneous electorate, the general election campaign requires similar 
organizational skills but different strategic plans and public appeals to build a majority 
coalition.  
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1.5 Plan of the Thesis 
The remainder of the study consists of four chapters. Chapter 2 presents ambition 
theory as described by Schlesinger, addresses some of the criticism raised against it, 
and lays out the hypotheses that guide the study. Chapter 3 describes the research 
design and the quantitative procedure W-NOMINATE. Chapter 4 describes the 
findings and discusses them in relation to ambition theory. Chapter 5 summarizes the 
findings and suggests topics for further research. 
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2.0 A Theory of Ambition 
Schlesinger (1966: 1) asserted that “[a]mbition lies at the heart of politics. Politics 
thrive on the hope of preferment and the drive for office”. In other words, Schlesinger 
asserted that without ambition, the political life of any given entity would deteriorate. 
Indeed, 
 
[a] political system unable to kindle ambitions for office is as much in danger of breaking 
down as one unable to restrain ambitions. Representative government, above all, depends 
on a supply of men so driven; the desire for election and, more important, for reelection 
becomes the electorate’s restraint upon its public officials. No more irresponsible 
government is imaginable than one of high-minded men unconcerned for their political 
futures (Schlesinger 1966: 2). 
 
Ambition should, therefore, constitute an integral part of political analysis. This was 
not to say that ambition as the motive for individual political action had been 
neglected—there had been considerable concern among political scientists for 
understanding why men had political ambition4
“The central assumption of ambition theory is that a politician’s behavior is a response 
to his office goals” (Schlesinger 1966: 6). In other words, according to ambition 
theory, much of the politician’s behavior in one office can be explained in terms of his 
—but much less attention had been 
given to developing an understanding of the consequences of such ambition. Put 
another way, political ambition had been employed frequently as a dependent variable, 
but only sparingly as an independent variable. Hence, there was a need for “a theory 
which explicitly accepts the assumption that politicians respond primarily to their 
office goals, in effect an ambition theory of politics, rather than a theory which 
explains personal ambitions” (Schlesinger 1966: 4). Here, the explanatory variable is 
ambition—that which explains some other events or behavior. 
 
                                              
 
4 For example, see Harold Lasswell (1948).  
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ambition for some higher office. Once we know “what he wants to be” rather than 
“how he got to be where he is”, his—or her—behavior becomes understandable (Sigel 
1968: 286).  
 
A politician’s ambition, according to Schlesinger, is closely linked to the opportunity 
he or she faces. As he puts it, “[a] man in an office which may lead somewhere is more 
likely to have office ambition than a man in an office which leads nowhere” 
(Schlesinger 1966: 8). For example, a New York governor is more likely to have 
ambition of becoming president than his counterparts in Mississippi or South Dakota, 
because a New York governor is more likely actually to become president than the 
Mississippi or South Dakota governors (Schlesinger 1966: 9). Effectively, he is saying 
that ambition is not free floating (Prewitt 1967: 767). Rather, it “flow[s] from the 
expectations which are reasonable for a man in his position” (Schlesinger 1966: 9). 5
Effectively, Schlesinger (1966: 11) suggests that different career opportunities exist 
for different political positions—a “structure of political opportunities”. The wealth of 
political opportunity depends on the shape and size of this opportunity structure. The 
shape of the structure derives from “the ways in which men typically advance in 
   
 
The link between ambition and opportunity implies that ambition varies. As mentioned 
in the introduction, Schlesinger (1966: 10) suggests classifying ambition into three 
categories. The first category is discrete ambition, meaning the politician desires an 
“office for its specified term” and then intends to “withdraw from public office”. The 
second category is static ambition, meaning the politician wishes to “make a long 
career out of a particular office”. The third category is progressive ambition, meaning 
the politician aspires to “attain an office more important than the one he now seeks or 
is holding”.  
 
                                              
 
5 Former Presidents Clinton and Carter were governors of Arkansas and Georgia, respectively. Former New 
York Governors Nelson Rockefeller and Mario Cuomo went nowhere in their presidential bids. This fact adds 
weight to the importance of an up-to-date test of ambition theory. 
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politics” whereas the size of the structure consists of the “number of offices available 
and the frequency with which new men attain them” (Schlesinger 1966: 20). This 
“structure of opportunities”, according to ambition theory, is a useful guide to the 
effective ambitions of American politicians and their repercussions (Schlesinger 1966: 
199).  
 
2.1 Critique 
As correctly pointed out by Kenneth Prewitt (1967: 768), “Schlesinger’s ‘ambition 
theory’ and his evidence on the opportunity structure meet only in the assumptions he 
makes. Data and theory do not conjoin in the analysis itself”. In other words, 
Schlesinger assumes that ambition affects behavior, but nowhere does he offer proof 
that this is anything but an assumption. Instead, he proceeds to address the issue of the 
“opportunity structure” of public offices and then to finding and documenting the 
presence of such a structure. Schlesinger (1966: 198-199) defends his approach in the 
following way: 
 
It is true that I have presented no direct evidence about the ambitions of American 
politicians. I have only assumed that men’s ambitions are stirred by opportunities and, to 
the extent that experience brings order to opportunity, that opportunity will guide men’s 
ambitions. Nevertheless, by demonstrating the existence of a hierarchy of elective offices 
in the United States, and one in which the key positions are obvious positions, we bring 
reasonable order to the American political scene. I am well aware that I have not 
demonstrated either that American politicians do in fact perceive their opportunities as I 
have described them, or that the opportunity structure affects political aspirations. 
Nevertheless, I feel that the structure of opportunity is a useful guide to the effective 
ambitions of American politicians and their repercussions.   
 
Schlesinger’s disclaimer notwithstanding, his ambition theory is still “far more a 
theory of opportunity than it is a theory of ambition” (Sigel 1968: 287). To be a theory 
of ambition, it would need to be based on “data showing that ambitious politicians 
were aware of the presence of a political opportunity structure and then chose the 
targets of their ambitions accordingly.” Moreover, one would have to know “what role 
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(if any) ambition played in the heads of those men (successful and unsuccessful) who 
deliberately by-passed the standard routes to office” (Sigel 1968: 287). Schlesinger 
only shows that politicians in key positions more often than not walk a certain path to 
success. He does not make clear if this is the best path and hence is deliberately chosen 
by men of ambition because they know it to be the best path or whether ambitious men 
happen to have been successful via this path (Sigel 1968: 287). 
 
To sum up, so far, this chapter has presented ambition theory as described by 
Schlesinger. It has then outlined some of the criticism toward the theory, leaning 
primarily on Prewitt and Sigel. The criticism is primarily concerned with the lack of 
connection between the theory and the data Schlesinger presents to substantiate his 
claims. The rest of the chapter deals with the hypotheses that have guided the study. 
 
2.2 Hypotheses 
If ambition theory is right, the ambitious politician should be acting today in terms of 
the electorate of the office which he or she hopes to win tomorrow. He or she must be 
interested in compiling a voting record that is perceived to be appealing to the desired, 
not the current, electorate. This situation should lead to some noticeable alterations in 
previously established voting patterns (Hibbing 1986: 653)--patterns that are found to 
be quite stable across time (Asher and Weisberg 1978, Nokken 2000, Poole 2003, 
Nokken and Poole 2004).  
 
Senators who are running for reelection to the Senate generally appeal to the same 
electorate, though that electorate may change internally as to its makeup. 
Consequently, there is little reason to expect their voting behavior to be fundamentally 
transformed. Senators who decide to run for president, however, target a significantly 
different electorate than that they targeted in running for the Senate. According to 
ambition theory, they are likely to be concerned about appealing to the nationwide, not 
the statewide, electorate.  Their Senate voting records as Election Day approaches 
should reflect this concern. A plausible, general hypothesis, therefore, would be that if 
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ambition theory is right, a greater degree of behavioral alteration should be registered 
by senators running for president than by senators running for reelection to the 
Senate. 
 
Contenders must travel widely to gain exposure to potential supporters and rank-and-
file voters (individuals constituting the body of the party as distinguished from 
leaders). Therefore, during the inter-election period, senators running for president can 
be expected to feel less pressured to stay in Washington to attend to Senate business. 
Their increasing absence from Washington should be visible in their attendance. 
Therefore, during the inter-election period, it is expected that contenders’ attendance 
will decline. 
 
As argued in Chapter 1, the nomination and general election processes have an 
influence in terms of which strategies contenders choose when pursuing the 
nomination and during the general election, for instance, and most importantly for the 
purposes of this study, in terms of what electoral groups they focus on. In short, when 
pursuing the nomination, contenders aim their message at party activists; during the 
general election, they aim their message at rank-and-file members of their party and at 
independent voters to build a majority coalition.  
 
Given that party activists are more ideologically constrained and more homogenous 
than average voters, contenders can be expected to become more ideological, or more 
partisan, during the inter-election period. More precisely, it is expected that 
contenders’ voting records will show a movement to the extremes of the liberal-
conservative spectrum as the primary season approaches.    
 
Given that the nationwide electorate is less ideologically constrained and less 
homogenous than party activists, contenders can be expected to become more 
moderate in order to appeal to more people as the general election approaches. A 
plausible hypothesis, therefore, would be that it is expected that contenders’ voting 
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records will show a movement to the middle of the liberal-conservative spectrum as 
the general election approaches. However, testing this hypothesis would be difficult 
for two reasons:  
 
First, front-loading6
Second, because the post-convention/pre-election phase constitutes such a small part 
of the electoral process, it would be difficult, even impossible, to discern position 
shifting in this phase using a summary measure of ideology such as NOMINATE 
scores which are estimated per Congress (e.g. per second year) rather than per month 
or even year. Estimated per Congress, NOMINATE scores would mask possible shifts 
toward the middle of the liberal-conservative spectrum in the post-convention/pre-
election phase. Estimating NOMINATE scores for a shorter period of time would 
increase the uncertainty for the reported scores. Being unable to conduct quantitative 
analysis using NOMINATE scores to probe for position shifting in the post-
convention/pre-election phase limits their utility somewhat. On the other hand, 
 of both parties’ primaries and caucuses ends the nomination 
process’s competitive phase very early, lengthening the period during which victorious 
contenders must maintain media attention, improve their presidential image, broaden 
their issue appeals, and prepare for launching their official campaign for their party’s 
nomination (Edwards III and Wayne 2006: 46). However, the nomination process’s 
competitive phase still constitutes the largest part of the electoral process. Primary 
campaigning starts in January of the election year, but today it is customary for 
contenders to start preparations before the midterm elections preceding the presidential 
contest, e.g. two years prior (Edwards III and Wayne 2006: 33). The gestation phase 
may span several years. The post-convention/pre-election phase, on the contrary, lasts 
only three to four months. Relative to the primary phase, therefore, the post-
convention/pre-election phase is very short.  
 
                                              
 
6 In American politics, front-loading refers to the recent tendency of states to hold primaries early to capitalize 
on media attention (Edwards et al 2002). 
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NOMINATE scores make ideology amenable for quantitative analyses and allow for 
comparisons over longer periods and between individuals.  
 
To sum up, based on ambition theory, and given the demands of the contemporary 
nomination process, the following hypotheses have been derived. One, a greater 
degree of behavioral alteration should be registered by those senators running for 
president than by those senators running for reelection to the Senate. Two, contenders’ 
percentage of missed roll call votes can be expected to progressively increase during 
the inter-election period. Three, their voting records can be expected to show 
movement to the extremes of the liberal-conservative spectrum as the primary season 
approaches. Because the fourth hypothesis is difficult to test using a summary measure 
of ideology, testing it is left for future research. 
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3.0 Research Design and Methodology 
Surprisingly few studies have analyzed the ambition-behavior relationship. Moreover, 
existing studies have primarily been concerned with the effect of senatorial ambition in 
the House of Representatives. Therefore, this study looks at the effect of presidential 
ambition in the Senate. However, for both substantial and methodological reasons, the 
Senate appears to provide a good setting for exploring the contribution that ambition 
theory can make to understanding legislative behavior. 
 
First, one of the most interesting findings in Ambition and Politics, for purposes of this 
study, is the indication that the effects of ambition are most pronounced at the highest 
level of the political system. Based on his findings on career patterns, Schlesinger 
concludes that despite the fact that there are relatively few prerequisites for office and 
a multitude of entry points, there is considerable order discernible in American 
political recruitment patterns.  Further, he also finds that there are definite marks of 
hierarchy in the system, one of which is that “the higher the office the fewer and more 
sharply defined its career lines” and hence, the more pronounced and clear the effect 
of ambition on behavior. Based on this finding, contenders for the Presidency are 
appropriate subjects for investigation, given the intent of the study to examine 
ambition theory (Lubalin 1981: 13-15).  
 
Second, in Ambition and Politics, Schlesinger locates “manifest” offices empirically, 
by tracing the frequency with which certain positions are used as stepping stones to 
other, higher offices. Lubalin (1981: 15) suggests the Senate possess the characteristics 
that Schlesinger attributes to such offices.  
 
Conventional wisdom supports the notion of the Senate as a breeding ground for the 
Presidency and Vice Presidency. It has been called the “Mother of Presidents”, 
“presidential incubator”, “presidential nursery”, and “presidential pre-school” (Dewar 
1980; Peabody et al 1976; MacNeil 1972). In fact, nearly every senator has been 
considered a potential candidate for president at one time or another simply because of 
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the office he or she occupies (Burden 2002: 81). The Senate became a very salient 
manifest office for those seeking the Presidency particularly in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. In this period, there was an increase both in numbers of senatorial contenders 
and success by senators in securing the nomination (Lubalin 1981: 15, 26). Some 
elections have seen many senators running for president simultaneously. For example, 
the 1976 contest brought out Senators Birch Bayh, Lloyd Bentson, Robert Byrd, Frank 
Church and Henry “Scoop” Jackson.  
 
However, the historical record shows that it is almost unheard of for presidents to 
come directly from the Senate. In fact, of the forty-four U.S. presidents, only three—
Warren Harding in 1920, John F. Kennedy in 1960, and Barack Obama in 20087
Why choose the Senate as setting for exploring the ambition-behavior relationship? 
The fact that many senators have been called, but few chosen, has not deterred 
senators from running for president. In fact, since 1976, an average of four senators 
have run per election year, with the 1976 election seeing as many as five senators 
running for president (See tables 4.1 and 4.2). Thus, while history shows that senators 
have fared less well than conventional wisdom would suggest, from 1960 to 1996, 
senators made up the largest grouping of presidential contenders at more than one-
third of the total (Burden 2002: 95). The decision to evaluate ambition theory using the 
Senate as setting is thus well grounded. 
—
moved straight from the Senate to the White House. Of the fifty-five presidential 
elections held since 1789, only fifteen saw current or even former senators win. 
Considering only contemporary elections, some of the worst defeats were suffered by 
senators running for president. Among others, Senators Barry Goldwater (1964), 
George McGovern (1972), Walter Mondale (1984), and Bob Dole (1996) lost by large 
margins. Of the last eight presidents, only Nixon had senatorial experience, and he had 
but a partial term as a senator (Burden 2002: 82). 
 
                                              
 
7 Elected in 2008, President Barack Obama is not included in the dataset.  
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Third, choosing the Senate setting makes sense on methodological grounds. For one, it 
is accessible and well researched. More importantly, investigating governors—the 
other major group of contenders for the Presidency—would have been a 
methodological challenge given the dramatic variations in the positions and politics 
from which gubernatorial contenders are drawn. Examination of the effect of ambition 
on the behavior of senators running for president, on the other hand, means that 
variations in the offices held by contenders are kept to a minimum. Moreover, the 
respect in the Senate for each senator’s rights, the individualistic ethos of the 
institution and the tolerance for each member’s political needs and idiosyncrasies, give 
members considerable latitude in defining the scope and style of their participation 
(Lubalin 1981: 16).   
 
Since nearly every senator has been considered a potential candidate for president at 
one time or another, one must decide upon exactly whom to study. Barry C. Burden 
(2002: 94) defines candidates who seriously pursue a presidential bid as presidential 
“contenders” and defines them as “people who chose to move beyond just being 
considered potential candidates by actually initiating their candidacies.” His 
operational definition of a “contender” is “any presidential candidate who officially 
declares his or her candidacy and runs in at least one primary outside of his home state 
(to avoid the idiosyncratic ‘favorite-son’ phenomenon8
                                              
 
8 A favorite son (or a favorite daughter) is a 
)” (Burden 2002: 94). As he 
points out, “these criteria are a reasonable compromise between analyzing the 
thousands of possible candidates and studying only party nominees” (Burden 2002: 
94). In the following analysis, I draw on Burden’s definitions, but I confine the scope 
to senators. Since I look at political ambition’s effect on legislative behavior in the 
political term that can refer to a) A politician whose electoral appeal 
derives from his or her regional appeal, rather than his or her political views; or b) A member of a political party 
favored by the party leadership to assume a prominent role. In American politics, nominating favorite sons was 
used as a technique to send uncommitted delegations to the national conventions. A popular, well-known 
governor or senator would be nominated, but was not a serious candidate. At some point during the convention, 
he would withdraw, thus freeing his delegates to support another candidate.  
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Senate, I observe only senators who were serving in the Senate when they initiated 
their presidential candidacies. 
 
I have further chosen to confine the study to the period from 1976 to 2004. I have done 
so for three reasons. First, as summarized by Lubalin (1981: 46, 52), during the thirty 
years following World War II, the American presidential nomination process was 
transformed by three major developments that had pervasive effect on both delegate 
and contender behavior: 1) an increase in popular influence; 2) a revolution in the 
American communications system; and 3) the nationalization and increasing 
competitiveness of American presidential politics. These developments altered the 
parameters of presidential nomination contesting as they confronted aspiring 
presidential candidates with new opportunities and liabilities in their quest for the 
Presidency.  
 
Second, changes in the nature of the presidential nomination process during the thirty 
years following World War II occurred together with changes in the Senate during this 
period. As argued by Lubalin (1981; 66), this greatly benefitted ambitious senatorial 
presidential contenders over their traditional gubernatorial rivals, especially senators of 
the congressional partisan majority. The opportunities offered senators by virtue of 
their membership in the Senate of the 1960s and 1970’s gave them unique advantages 
in the nomination process, shared and surpassed, perhaps, only by those enjoyed by the 
Vice President. The historical records support Lubalin’s assessment. The changes in 
the nomination process and in the Senate during the 1960s and 1970s coincide with a 
string of successes by senators during that time in contesting presidential nominations.  
 
The third reason I have chosen to confine the analysis to the post-World War II era, 
more precisely 1976-2004, is of a methodological nature. My main data sources for 
identifying senators who have run for president are the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) Presidential Address lists, which contain data on all individuals who have 
declared their candidacies for the Presidency. The FEC was created by Congress in 
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1975 to administer and enforce the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), the statute 
that governs the financing of federal elections, enacted in 1974 (FEC 2009). 
Consequently, FEC’s data goes back only to the 1976 Presidential Election.  
 
Given the scope of the study, a choice regarding how to confine the analysis had to be 
made. The enactment of FECA marks, in several respects, the beginning of the 
nomination process as we know it today. FECA has had a major effect on the 
nomination process by altering the way in which money is raised and spent, greatly 
increasing the amount available to candidates, parties and nonparty groups. More 
specifically, it provided for public disclosure, contribution ceilings, campaign 
spending limits, and federal subsidies for the nomination process (Presidential 
Leadership). Thus, the period 1976 through 2004 seems to constitute a natural unit for 
analysis.  
 
Based on availability of data and because the period 1976 through 2004 seems to 
constitute a natural unit for analysis, the following analysis is confined to senators who 
sought their party’s nomination in the eight presidential elections that took place 
during that period. This results in a total of twenty-seven senators. Of these, two 
sought the nomination more than once, Senator Robert Dole of Kansas who sought the 
nomination in 1980, 1988 and 1996 and Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut 
who sought the nomination in 2000 and 2004. In total therefore, senators pursued the 
presidential nomination thirty times from 1976 to 2004.  
 
3.1 The Analytical Technique 
Chapter 2, section 2.2, identified two hypotheses about how ambition might be 
expected to influence contenders’ legislative behavior. One approach to assessing the 
extent to which these hypotheses are supported is to compare contenders to their 
colleagues to see if their legislative behavior differs from that of other senators in a 
predictable manner.  
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To explore the effect of presidential ambition on legislative behavior in the Senate, I 
compare the behavior of the senatorial presidential contenders with that of their 
colleagues, from 1976 to 2004. To allow for a more in-depth examination of the effect 
of ambition on behavior, I compare contenders individually to both Democratic and 
Republican colleagues. 
 
I compare contenders to their colleagues for three Congresses prior to their bid for the 
Presidency and for the Congress of the election year. I have done so for two reasons. 
One, a Congress constitutes a short period of time in most senators’ service as senators 
are elected for six-year terms and often get re-elected over and over again. In 
recognition of the possibility that changes in voting behavior may only be arbitrary, 
the observation period is expanded to eight years. Moreover, the assumption that “our 
ambitious politician must act today in terms of the electorate of the office he hopes to 
win tomorrow” implies that the politician must start early to appeal to the electorate of 
the office being sought. An observation period of eight years seems a reasonable 
compromise between analyzing senators’ behavior from the time the senators were 
first elected, and doing the same but only for the two years of the pertinent Congress. 
 
Specifically, I record each contender’s percentage of missed votes and estimate each 
contender’s W-NOMINATE score, along with the standard error. In addition, I 
estimate the Senate medians for missed votes and W-NOMINATE scores for the 
pertinent Congresses. 
  
3.3 NOMINATE 
As mentioned in the introduction, voting positions are often described in terms of the 
concept of ideology. NOMINATE is a scaling program which is designed to measure 
ideology. This chapter explains the logic and assumptions upon which it is based. It 
opens with an explanation of spatial models of choice, then proceeds to the spatial 
theory of voting. Finally, it offers an explanation of how spatial theory of voting, 
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positing a multidimensional issue space with each issue having its own dimension, 
(Poole 1999: 2), may be reconciled with low-dimensional maps. 
 
3.3.1 NOMINATE – Background 
According to political scientist Keith T. Poole (1999: 1), “the correct way to measure 
ideology or Conversian belief systems [is] through empirical estimation of spatial 
models of choice”. As explained by him, in spatial models of choice, or more 
specifically, in spatial models of voting, 
 
each legislator is represented by one point and each roll call is represented by two 
points—one for Yea and one for Nay. On every roll call each legislator votes for the 
closer outcome point, at least probabilistically. These points form a spatial map that 
summarizes the roll calls (Poole 2005: 1). 
 
A spatial map formed from roll calls provides a way of visualizing the political world 
of a legislature. The closeness of two legislators in the map shows the similarity of 
their voting records, and the distribution of legislators shows what the dimensions of 
voting are (Poole 2005: 1). Poole illustrates this as shown below: 
 
 
(Poole 2005: 6) 
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The number of dimensions needed to adequately represent the points is usually small 
because “legislators typically decide how to vote on the basis of their positions on a 
small number of underlying or basic dimensions” (Poole 2005: 1). An indication of the 
low dimensionality of voting is found in the ease with which we usually can predict 
how a “liberal” or a “conservative” will vote on most issues. The underlying or basic 
dimensions structure the roll call votes and are captured by the spatial maps (Poole 
2005: 1). 
 
The Spatial Theory of Voting 
As explained by Poole (2005: 7), in its simplest form, “the spatial theory of voting can 
be represented as a map of voters and candidates where the voters vote for the 
candidate closest to them”. When applied to a parliamentary setting, “voters” and 
“candidates” are simply replaced by “legislators” and “policy outcomes” (Poole 2005: 
8-9). 
 
According to Poole (2005) the intellectual origins of the spatial theory of voting can be 
traced to Hotelling (1929) and Smithies (1941). However, not until 1957 and the 
publication of Downs’s seminal An Economic Theory of Democracy was spatial theory 
established as a conceptual tool (Poole 2005: 7).9
                                              
 
9 For a thorough discussion of the early contributions to spatial theory, see Keith T. Poole (2005). 
 In short, the treatise puts forth a 
model with precise conditions under which economic theory can be applied to political 
decision making. Moreover, Downs presents three major theoretical claims of which 
the first is of particular interest here—the median voter theorem. According to the 
median voter theorem, to maximize their chances of being elected, candidates must 
take a position at the median of a normal distribution of voters. A candidate who does 
not do so can be circumvented by another candidate who takes a position between the 
first candidate and the median voter.  
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However, An Economic Theory of Democracy did not present spatial theory in a way 
that was amenable to empirical testing. More specifically, “[n]o rigorous mathematical 
structure was presented from which measuring instruments could be constructed to 
actually test the theory” (Poole 2005: 8). The task of providing such a structure was 
claimed—and completed—by political scientists Otto Davis, Melvin Hinich, and Peter 
Ordeshook in the early 1970s (Poole 2005: 8). The structure was as follows: 
 
The dimensions of the space represented issues/policies. Each voter had a position on 
each issue/policy and this vector of positions was the voter’s ideal point in the space. 
Each voter also had a utility function centered on her ideal point that assigned a utility to 
each point in the space. The further a point was from the voter’s ideal point, the lower the 
utility. Each candidate also had a position on each position and therefore was represented 
as a point in the space. Each voter then voted for the candidate for whom she had the 
highest utility (Poole 2005: 8). 
 
The new version of the theory had, however, one major shortcoming. It did not allow 
for “error” on the voters’ part. In other words, the theory assumed that voters always 
voted sincerely, that is, never strategically, or due to some other reason, contrary to 
how they usually voted (Poole 2005: 9). This shortcoming has been addressed, and the 
contemporary version of the theory allows for “errors” to occur. The shortcoming 
notwithstanding, the new and improved version of the 1970s made the spatial theory of 
voting amenable for empirical testing. 
 
The Puzzle of Low Dimensionality 
Standard spatial theory posits a multidimensional issue space with each issue having 
its own dimension (Poole 1999: 2). How, then, can it be reconciled with low-
dimensional maps? Peter Ordeshook’s (1976) theory of the “Basic Space”—a small 
number of underlying fundamental dimensions that generate all the specific issue 
dimensions--provides a possible answer.  
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As mentioned in the introduction, according to Converse (1964: 207), an ideology—or 
a belief system—is “a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are 
bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence”. By 
“constraint” he means, as clarified by Poole (2005: 13-14), that “issues are interrelated 
or bundled and that ideology is fundamentally the knowledge of what-goes-with-what”. 
In other words, “[f]rom an observer’s point of view, the knowledge of one or two issue 
positions makes the remaining positions very predictable” (Poole 2005: 14).  
 
The simplest yet most efficient continuum of positions is the continuum of positions 
ranging from liberal to moderate to conservative. In the words of Converse (1964: 
214): 
 
[t]he efficiency of such a yardstick in the evolution of events is quite obvious. Under 
certain appropriate circumstances, the single word “conservative” used to describe a piece 
of proposed legislation can convey a tremendous amount of more specific information 
about the bill—who probably proposed it and toward what ends, who is likely to resist 
it…its long-term consequences…and how the actor himself should expect to evaluate it. 
 
Most people, however, it has been shown, do not have highly structured attitudes about 
politics (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1963; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 
1978, cited in Poole 2005). On the other hand, it has been argued that people are not 
“ideologically innocent” either, and that: 
 
Americans do, for the most part, understand the philosophical underpinnings of the 
policies they endorse, and that, much more than the belief systems literature would lead 
one to expect, Americans make use of cultural values and principles in explicating and 
justifying their political preferences (Feldman and Zaller 1992: 269). 
 
The extent to which people are ideologically consistent, however, clearly varies (Poole 
2005: 14). Many political science studies have sought to find the answer to how and 
why. Here, it suffices to state that ideological consistency is almost certainly a top-
down phenomenon—meaning that [p]olitical elites are more ideologically consistent 
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than the mass public. This, it is argued, quite likely has an effect on how issues are 
“packaged” (Hinich and Munger 1997: 180-213, cited in Poole 2005). Consequently, 
“members of national legislatures such as the U.S. Congress should exhibit highly 
structured belief systems” (Poole 2005:14). 
 
To the extent that legislators do have highly structured belief systems, “within the 
spatial theory of voting this means that their issue positions lie on a low-dimensional 
plane through the issue space because attitudes across the issues are constrained” 
(Poole 2005: 15). In other words, to the extent the legislators are ideologically 
consistent, within the spatial theory of voting, only one or two fundamental 
dimensions are necessary to describe their specific issue positions because attitudes 
across the issues are interrelated or bundled. The liberal-conservative continuum is 
found to be one fundamental dimension; another, now largely unimportant, is related 
to the issue of race (Poole and Rosenthal 1997: 5).  
 
Low dimensionality in voting implies two spaces—one with a few fundamental 
dimensions such as the liberal-conservative continuum and a high-dimensional space 
representing all the distinct issues. As explained by Poole (2005: 15): 
 
[S]uppose there are s fundamental dimensions, p voters, and q issues where s < q. Let X 
be the p by s matrix of ideal points of the p voters on the s dimensions and let Y be the p 
by n matrix of voters’ ideal points on the n issues. The presence of constraint means that 
the voter’s positions on the fundamental dimensions X generate all the issue positions Y; 
that is, XW=Y where the s by q matrix W maps the fundamental dimensions onto the 
issue dimensions. 
 
This algorithm is known as the two-space theory, and it was the result of combined 
efforts by Cahoon, Hinich, and Ordeshook. The low dimensional space was called a 
basic space and the high dimensional space an action space (Poole 2005: 15). To 
conclude, the two-space theory, which assumes a basic space—a small number of 
underlying fundamental dimensions that generate all the specific issue dimensions—
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may explain how spatial theory, which posits a multidimensional issue space with each 
issue having its own dimension can be reconciled with low-dimensional spatial maps. 
  
According to Poole (1999: 2), “Converse’s belief system theory with its emphasis on 
‘constraint’ fits like a key into a lock with the Ordeshook-Hinich spatial theory of 
choice.” Together, these two theories form the foundation upon which NOMINATE 
rests. 
  
3.3.2 NOMINATE-The Procedure 
In spatial models of parliamentary voting, policies are represented as points in a low-
dimensional—or basic—space. Legislators have a most preferred policy—or ideal 
point—in this space and their utility for a given policy declines as the distance of the 
policy from their ideal point declines. Ideal points are estimated from roll call data. 
Thus, legislators’ ideal point is a measure of their legislative preference, a proxy for 
their ideology. There are several ways of estimating ideal points. I rely on 
NOMINATE—Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal’s multidimensional metric 
unfolding procedure.  
 
Underlying NOMINATE is an assumption that voting in Congress is entirely driven by 
one basic dimension—liberalism-conservatism—so that legislators’ degree of 
liberalism determines all their issue positions. Translated into standard spatial theory, 
members are arrayed from left to right on a single dimension, have symmetric utility 
functions centered at their ideal points, and when faced with a choice between the two 
alternatives corresponding to Yea and Nay on a roll call, they vote for the alternative 
closest to them on the dimension (Poole 1999: 3).  
 
Assuming roll call voting is in accord with this model, the scaling problem consists of 
taking a roll call matrix and “unscrambling” it—meaning finding a rank ordering of 
legislators and the correct “polarity” (Yea to the left of the cut point or Yea to the right 
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of the cut point) for each roll call. If the data is perfect, the solution is easy and the 
correct rank ordering is always found (Poole 1999: 3). 
 
Error in the data complicates the procedure. When there is error in the data, the aim is 
to find a rank ordering that maximizes the correct classification of the observed Yeas 
and Nays. This is not a simple task because if there are n legislators, then there are n!/2 
possible rank orders to check to find the best one. For example, for 50 legislators this 
number is about 1.52*1064—a formidable number even with modern supercomputers. 
Consequently, “Edith”—an early version of NOMINATE—embodies a “sensible” 
search procedure (“Heuristic”) to find a solution. A good starting rank order of the 
legislators is generated and the corresponding cutting points are found. These cutting 
points are used to get a new rank ordering of the legislators, and so on. At each step 
the correct classification increases until a rank order is found that produces cutting 
points that reproduce the rank order (Poole 1999: 4). 
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, there were three loosely aligned voting blocs in 
Congress, Northern Democrats, Southern Democrats, and Republicans. This alignment 
strongly implied that one needed two basic dimensions to adequately account for roll 
call voting. Moreover, even if voting was one-dimensional, “Edith” treated all errors 
exactly alike. This treatment clearly did not make sense on substantive grounds. For 
example, Ted Kennedy’s defecting from his fellow liberals and voting with Jesse 
Helms seems to be a bigger error than does a moderate’s (like John Heinz) defecting 
from his fellow moderates and voting with Jesse Helms (Poole 1999: 5).  
 
These shortcomings were addressed by transferring a standard decision model from 
economics to a legislative setting. In this model, legislators have utility functions and 
they vote for the alternative on a roll call for which they have the highest utility. This 
utility function consists of (1) a deterministic component that is a function of the 
distance between the legislator and a roll call outcome in the basic space; and (2) a 
41 
 
 
stochastic component that represents the idiosyncratic component of utility (Poole 
1999: 5). 
 
It is assumed that the stochastic component is a random draw from the logit 
distribution. Given these random draws, it is possible to calculate the probabilities of 
each legislator voting Yea or Nay. Therefore, given a matrix of roll calls, the problem 
is to estimate legislator ideal points and roll call outcomes that maximize the joint 
probability of the observed votes. Estimating ideal points and outcomes that 
maximizes the joint probability of the observed votes is what NOMINATE is designed 
to do (Poole 1999: 5). 
 
3.3.3 The Pitfalls of NOMINATE—and How to Avoid Them 
Over the last 15 years, much scholarship in legislative politics has used NOMINATE 
or other similar procedures to construct measures of legislators’ ideological locations 
(Lewis and Poole 2003: 1). Recent work in political methodology has focused on the 
pitfalls of using such estimates as variables in subsequent analysis without explicitly 
accounting for their uncertainty and possible bias (Herron and Shotts 2003). Lewis and 
Poole (2003) present a method of forming unconditional standard error estimates and 
bias estimates for NOMINATE scores using the parametric bootstrap. 
 
The bootstrap is usually used to provide estimates of the standard errors and 
confidence intervals that do not rely on asymptotic normality. When the non-
parametric bootstrap is employed, the resulting confidence interval and standard errors 
are non-parametric in the sense that they do not rely on the correctness of the 
likelihood function for the data. This can be particularly useful in cases where 1) the 
robustness to distributional assumptions is of great concern; 2) the estimation is itself 
non-parametric; or 3) the samples are too small to rely on asymptotic approximations 
(Lewis and Poole 2003: 4).  
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More importantly, for the purposes of this study, the bootstrap also allows for 
estimating the uncertainty of auxiliary quantities of interest such as the location of the 
median legislator. Recovering the variance-covariance matrix of parameter estimates, 
by forming and inverting the full (estimated) information matrix for roll call voting 
models such as NOMINATE, is sufficiently difficult such that the bootstrap is an 
attractive and tractable alternative (Lewis and Poole 2003: 4). 
 
3.4 Data and Sources 
To distinguish those who seriously pursued a presidential bid from the large pool of 
possible contenders, I use the Federal Election Commission’s Presidential Address 
Lists 1976-2004, provided by the FEC’s Information Division.  
 
Pursuant to the FECA, all individuals who are running for the U.S. House, Senate or 
the Presidency must register with the FEC once they (or persons acting on their behalf) 
receive contributions or make expenditures in excess of $5,000. Within 15 days of 
reaching that $5,000 threshold, they must file a Statement of Candidacy authorizing a 
principal campaign committee to raise and spend funds on their behalf. Within 10 days 
of that filing, their principal campaign committee must submit a Statement of 
Organization (FEC 2009). 
 
The FEC Presidential Address Lists contain the names and addresses of individuals 
and committees who were involved in presidential campaigns from 1976 to the 
present. Section I of the list includes all individuals whose campaigns have submitted 
statements and reports to the FEC indicating that they consider themselves to be 
“candidates” for the office of president. The term “candidate”, moreover, is defined in 
2 United States Code Sec. 431 to mean  
 
an individual who seeks nomination for election, or election, to federal office, and for 
purposes of this paragraph, an individual shall be deemed to seek nomination for election, 
or election if a) such individual has received contributions aggregating in excess of 
$5,000 or has made expenditures aggregating in excess of $5,000; or b) such individual 
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has given his or her consent to another person to receive contributions or make 
expenditures on behalf of such individual and if such person has received such 
contributions aggregating in excess of $5,000 or has made such expenditures aggregating 
in excess of $5,000 (FEC 2009). 
  
Section II includes all individuals who have filed statements of candidacy and/or 
committee statements of organization, regardless of the amounts of activity in the 
campaign. In this study, I concentrate on the group of candidates who have received or 
spent more than $5,000 on their campaigns. 
 
To distinguish serious contenders from potential favorite sons or daughters, I analyze 
the statistics on every primary from 1976 to 2004 provided by Congressional Quarterly 
and published in Guide to U.S Elections 1789-2004 (CQ Press 2006). Additional 
sources on senators who have run for president include The Congressional 
Biographical Directory 1789-2005 (Congress, Joint Committee on Printing 2005) and 
various summaries of the Democratic and Republican national conventions. 
 
The roll call data is obtained from political scientists Poole and Rosenthal’s website 
Voteview, established August 1995 at the Graduate School of Industrial 
Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University, now affiliated with the Department of 
Political Science at the University of California, San Diego.  
 
Roll call matrices and codebooks for Congresses 109-110 are compiled by Jeff Lewis 
and Keith Poole. Roll call matrices and codebooks for Congresses 102-108 are 
compiled by Keith Poole and Nolan McCarty. Roll call matrices and codebooks for 
Congresses 1-101 were originally compiled by the Interuniversity Consortium for 
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Political and Social Research (ICPSR) which is part of the Institute for Social 
Research at the University of Michigan10
Yet, the W-NOMINATE scores are not necessarily unfit as measures of voting 
positions for the purposes of this study. As explained in the introduction, to locate a 
politician’s voting position, NOMINATE uses information on who votes with whom 
and how often (Poole and Rosenthal 1997: 5). As mentioned in the introduction, if 
legislator A votes with legislators B and C much more frequently than legislators B 
and C vote together, then NOMINATE positions legislator A as moderate, in between 
legislator B and C. Given that there are relatively marginal differences between 
, then later revised by Poole et al.  
 
W-NOMINATE scores 
This study uses W-NOMINATE scores to measure voting positions. W-NOMINATE 
is a static (i.e., meant to be applied to only one Congress) version of D-NOMINATE, 
the original NOMINATE procedure. It has a number of improvements designed to 
increase the efficiency of the algorithm so that it can be run on personal computers. 
More specifically, it differs from D-NOMINATE in two ways: 1) It uses a slightly 
different deterministic utility function; and, 2) because it is a static algorithm, it 
constrains the legislators and roll call midpoints to lie within an s-dimensional hyper 
sphere of radius one (in contrast to the rather flexible constraint structure necessitated 
by the dynamic model). The W-NOMINATE scores are highly correlated with the D-
NOMINATE coordinates for most Congresses (Pearson r's typically greater than .95 
for both the 1st and 2nd dimensions). However, unlike the D-NOMINATE scores, W-
NOMINATE scores are not directly comparable between Congresses (Voteview 
2009).   
 
                                              
 
10 Established in 1962, ICPSR is the world's largest archive of digital social science data. ICPSR acquire, 
preserve, and distribute original research data and provide training in its analysis (ICPSR 2009).  
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Congresses, the rank ordering is relatively stable. In other words, the dimension along 
which the legislators are ordered is relatively constant. Thus, while W-NOMINATE 
scores, strictly speaking, should not be compared between Congresses, the practical 
consequences of doing so are relatively small. 
 
The robustness of the scores is further demonstrated by the fact that changing 
“polarities” (i.e. the “poles” determining how the other Senators are ordered) does not 
result in substantially different W-NOMINATE scores. In fact, use of four different 
conservative senators as “polarities” resulted in virtually no change at all for the 
pertinent Congress. This result strengthens the argument that while comparing W-
NOMINATE scores between Congresses may be problematic, for the purposes of this 
study, the practical consequences are relatively small.   
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4.0 Results and Discussion 
To test the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 2, I recorded each contender’s number and 
percentage of missed votes and estimated each contender’s W-NOMINATE score, 
along with the standard error, for three Congresses prior to their bid for the Presidency, 
and for the Congress of the election year. In addition, I calculated the party median for 
missed votes and W-NOMINATE scores for the pertinent Congresses. In this chapter, 
I present the results. The scope of the study does not allow for a detailed account of all 
the senators in the dataset. Instead, I use the eight elections as organizing principles 
and refer to individual senators where doing so serves to illustrate the main tendencies. 
 
4.1 Attendance 
As the data in table 4.1 show, most contenders’ percentage of missed roll call votes 
increases during the inter-election period, while the medians for the Democratic and 
Republican Parties remain relatively stable. However, the data in table 4.1 also show 
that the contenders’ tendency to miss progressively more votes as the election nears is 
not equally pronounced for everyone, nor is it equally pronounced throughout the 
period under observation.   
 
Data for the 1976 election11
                                              
 
11 E.g. the data for the contenders who ran for President in 1976. 
 reveal a consistent pattern. All contenders have a higher 
percentage of missed votes (hereafter abbreviated PMV) in the Congress of the 
election year than they have in the previous Congress. However, the contenders’ 
tendency to miss progressively more votes is far from equally pronounced for 
everyone. Senators Bayh, Bentsen and Church’s PMV increases during the inter-
election period. Senators Byrd and Jackson’s percentage, on the other hand, hardly 
increases at all. Their PMV is consistently low. The largest increase is registered for 
Senator Bayh who misses 17.4 % of the votes in the 93rd Congress and 32 % in the  
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Table 4.1 Percentage of Missed Votes (PMV) per Congress   
Name  Party EY* #** Time period 91 92 93 94 
Birch E. Bayh, Indiana D 1976 94 Jan. 3, 1975 20,1 17,9 17,4 32 
Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr., Texas D     -Jan. 3, 1977   9,3 17,7 20,4 
Robert C. Byrd, West Virginia D       1,2 0,9 0,1 0,8 
Frank Church, Idaho D       13,5 15,3 18,7 28 
Henry M. Jackson, Washington D       0,6 1,3 0 0,2 
Democratic Party D       11,9 10 9 9,4 
Republican Party R       6,6 8,5 10 10,2 
    1980 96 Jan. 3, 1979 93 94 95 96 
        -Jan. 3, 1981         
Howard H. Baker, Jr., Tennessee R       20 19,3 11,9 28,4 
Robert J. Dole, Kansas R       4,5 11,1 3,6 4,7 
Edward M. Kennedy, Massachusetts D       11,9 16,3 10,8 53,9 
Democratic Party D       9 9,4 6,7 9,2 
Republican Party R       10 10,2 9,1 7,8 
    1984 98 Jan. 3, 1983 95 96 97 98 
        -Jan. 3, 1985         
Alan M. Cranston, California D       7,1 9,8 9,6 33 
John H. Glenn, Jr., Ohio  D       1,4 5,8 11 27,9 
Gary W. Hart, Colorado D       6 8,1 6,3 46,9 
Ernest F. Hollings, South Carolina D       6 9,5 6,4 36,3 
Democratic Party D       6,7 9,2 4,6 5,2 
Republican Party R       9,1 7,8 3 5,3 
    1988 100 Jan. 3, 1987 97 98 99 100 
        -Jan. 3, 1989         
Joseph R. Biden, Delaware D       5,7 3,9 6,6 57,4 
Robert J. Dole, Kansas R       1,4 3,5 0,9 9,1 
Albert Gore, Jr., Tennessee D           0,4 36,9 
Paul M. Simon, Illinois D           3,9 42,3 
Democratic Party D       4,6 5,2 2,8 3,1 
Republican Party R       3 5,3 2,6 4,7 
    1992 102 Jan. 3, 1991 99 100 101 102 
        -Jan. 3, 1993         
Tom Harkin, Iowa D       2,4 4 1,1 25,3 
J. Robert (Bob) Kerrey, Nebreska D           0,3 19,6 
Democratic Party D       2,8 3,1 1 1,7 
Republican Party R       2,6 4,7 2 2,4 
    1996 104 Jan. 3, 1995 101 102 103 104 
        -Jan. 3, 1997         
Robert J. Dole, Kansas R       0,3 0,2 1,4 1,7 
William P. Gramm, Texas R       3,4 4,5 8,3 9,6 
Richard G. Lugar, Indiana R       2,2 2,5 0,7 3,3 
Arlen Specter, Pennsylvania R       0,2 2,7 9,3 1,5 
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Democratic Party D       1 1,7 1,4 1 
Republican Party R       2 2,4 2 1,4 
    2000 106 Jan. 3, 1999 103 104 105 106 
        -Jan. 3, 2001         
Orrin G. Hatch, Utah R       1,4 1,1 1 2,7 
Joe Lieberman, Connecticut D       1,4 1 0,7 10,1 
John McCain, Arizona R       4,8 3,4 4,4 29,8 
Robert C. Smith, New Hampshire R       1,5 1,2 0,5 0 
Democratic Party D       1,4 1 1 1 
Republican Party R       2 1,4 0,8 1 
    2004 108 Jan. 3, 2003 105 106 107 108 
        -Jan. 3, 2005         
John Edwards, North Carolina D         0,4 0,5 45,2 
Bob Graham, Florida D       0,2 0,9 0,2 25,2 
John Kerry, Massachusetts  D       1 2,8 3,2 72,3 
Joe Lieberman, Connecticut D       0,7 10,1 1,9 39,1 
Democratic Party D       1 1 0,8 1,7 
Republican Party R       0,8 1 2 1,4 
         * Election Year 
        ** Number of Congress 
         
94th, e.g. an increase of 14.6 percentage points. At the other end is Senator Jackson 
who does not miss a single vote in the 93rd Congress and only 0.2 % in the 94th.  
 
Data for the 1980, 1984, and 1988 elections do not only reveal consistent patterns but 
also a more pronounced tendency to miss progressively more votes. Almost all 
contenders have a considerably higher PMV in the Congress of the election year than 
they have in the previous Congresses. The only exception is Senator Dole whose PMV 
is consistently low, throughout both the inter-election period starting in 1976 and the 
one starting in 1984. He too, however, misses more votes when he runs for president 
than when he does not, but very few compared to the other contenders. In stark 
contrast to Senator Dole is Senator Biden who misses 6.6 % of the votes in the 99th 
Congress and 57.4 % in the 100th, e.g. an increase of 50.8 percentage points, an 
increase not surpassed until Senator Kerry ran for president in 2004. Senator Biden is, 
however, far from unique in this context. Five of the ten individual contenders for the 
1980, 1984, and 1988 elections have an increase larger than 30 percentage points 
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during the inter-election period, and none (with the exception of Senator Dole) has an 
increase smaller than 15. 
 
Data for the 1992 election reveal a consistent pattern and a pronounced tendency to 
miss progressively more votes for both contenders, with a 24.2 percentage point 
increase in PMV for Senator Harkin and a 19.3 percentage point increase in PMV for 
Senator Kerry. 
 
Data for the 1996 election reveal a consistent pattern with one exception. Senator 
Specter actually misses fewer votes in the 104th Congress than in the 103rd. This can 
easily be explained, however, by the fact that he withdrew very early in the race. On 
November 23, 1995, even before the start of the primaries, Specter suspended his 
campaign to endorse Senator Dole (Edsall 1995). In terms of strength, the tendency to 
miss progressively more votes is much less pronounced than in the 1980s and in the 
early 1990s. Whereas the 1980s and early 1990s see increases in contenders’ PMV 
ranging from 16.5 to 50.8 percentage points (Senator Baker, 1980, and Senator Biden, 
1988, respectively) the late 1990s do not see increases larger than 2.6 percentage 
points (Senator Lugar). 
  
Data for the 2000 election also reveal a consistent pattern with one exception. Senator 
Smith has a consistently low PMV, but miss even fewer votes in the 105th Congress 
and then none in the 106th Congress. Like Senator Specter, Senator Smith withdrew 
very early from the race, July 1999 (Schmitt 1999), and this early withdrawal can 
explain why he did not miss any votes in the 106th Congress. Though in average more 
pronounced than in the late 1990s, the tendency to miss progressively more votes is 
not equally so across contenders. Senators Hatch, Lieberman, and McCain’s PMV 
increase in the 106th Congress by 1.7, 9.4, and 25.4 percentage points, respectively. 
 
Data for the 2004 election, on the other hand, reveal a perfectly consistent pattern with 
pronounced increases in PMV across contenders. All contenders have a considerably 
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higher PMV in the Congress of the election year than they have in the previous 
Congress. Moreover, the increases range from 25 to 69.1 percentage points (Graham 
and Kerry, respectively). The largest increase in 2004, registered for Senator Kerry, is 
also the largest increase registered for the entire pool of contenders whose behavior 
have been observed herein. 
 
Up to this point, the account has focused on contenders’ behavior, or more precisely, 
alterations in contenders’ behavior in inter-election periods. As the data in table 4.1 
show, most contenders’ PMV increases during inter-election periods, while the Senate 
means remain relatively stable. Based on this observation, it can be argued that the 
decision to run for president leads to an increase in the contender’s PMV. However, 
there is a possibility that some senators’ PMV increases and decreases arbitrarily 
during their service. To infer that their decision to run for president leads to an 
increase in their PMV could consequently be wrong. In recognition of this possibility, 
the period of observation was expanded to eight years instead of just four, or to four 
Congresses instead of just two. This expanded observation revealed four tendencies. 
First, for six contenders, the PMV decreases from the first Congress to the third, then 
increases from the third to the fourth. Second, for five contenders, the PMV increases 
during all four Congresses. Third, for eleven contenders, the PMV increases from the 
first Congress to the second, then decreases from the second to the third, then increases 
again from the third to the fourth, forming a zigzag-like pattern. Fourth, for three 
contenders, the PMV decreases from the first Congress to the second, then increases 
from the second to the fourth.12
However, the increases and decreases are seldom large, at least not compared to most 
increases in the inter-election periods leading up to the elections in which the 
contenders observed here ran. On the contrary, the contenders tend to be quite stable 
  
 
                                              
 
12 In addition, for one contender, the PMV decreased during all four Congresses. For another, the PMV increased 
progressively before it decreased considerably from the third Congress to the fourth. Three contenders served in 
only two Congresses prior to the Congress of the election year.   
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when it comes to being present and voting, tracking the rest of the Senate members, up 
until, generally speaking, the beginning of the inter-election period leading up to the 
election in which they ran. 
 
The key point from the section above is that contenders tend to be quite stable 
concerning being present and voting, tracking other Senate members, up until, 
generally, the beginning of the inter-election period leading up to the election in which 
they ran when most contenders’ PMV increase considerably. This, in turn, points to 
the likelihood that the increases we see in contenders’ PMV are not arbitrary. 
 
4.1.1 Summary of Findings for Attendance 
As data in table 4.1 indicate, the decision to run for president seems to take a toll on 
contenders’ attendance. Throughout the pertinent inter-election periods, most 
contenders’ attendance decreases progressively. As the Senate means indicate, most 
members seem to miss a few more votes in an election year, but there is a major 
difference in the size of the attendance decline depending upon the office goals of the 
members.  
 
However, the data reveals variations among the progressively ambitious. Despite the 
overall tendency apparent in the data, a closer look reveals different patterns among 
contenders. Consider the cases of Senators Jackson and Smith. They were by any 
definition serious contenders, but did not alter their attendance. Senators Dole and 
Lugar too hardly altered their attendance. Consider also the cases of Senators Dole and 
Kerry, the only nominees in the dataset. Dole’s decision to run for president does not 
seem to affect at all his tendency to be present and voting. Kerry’s decision to run, on 
the contrary, seems to affect considerably his tendency to be present and voting. 
However, the number of contenders whose PMV increases considerably is sufficiently 
large to argue in favor of hypothesis two, namely that contenders’ attendance will 
decline progressively during the inter-election period. If one can say nothing else, one 
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can say that decisions to run for president reasonably can be expected to be followed 
by a considerable decline in contenders’ attendance. 
 
There is also considerable variation across decades. Whereas the (late) 1970s and 
1980s see considerable drops in attendance by contenders in the inter-election period, 
particularly in the Congress of the election year, the 1990s hardly see drops in 
attendance at all. However, explanations as to why these variations occur are beyond 
the scope of the study. 
 
In Chapter 2 it was hypothesized that contenders’ attendance will decline during the 
inter-election period leading up to the election in which they plan to run. The findings 
presented above provide support for this hypothesis. Although the patterns for 
individual contenders vary, data regarding the attendance of all but three contenders 
are consistent with this hypothesis. This, in turn, provides support for ambition theory. 
Particularly the material presented in the analysis of individual senators indicates that 
their presidential ambition affected their legislative behavior.  
 
These findings are consistent with conventional wisdom. Running for president is a 
rigorous endeavor and it surely progressively cuts into the time a senator spends in 
Washington. A study is hardly needed to convince readers of that. However, as pointed 
out by Hibbing (1986: 663), 
 
by presenting specific evidence on the connection between ambition and political 
behavior we can begin to move beyond the stage where we are only able to say “ambition 
matters”. Determining the extent to which ambition influences political behavior will 
permit us to make more informed statements about the positive and negative aspects of 
ambition--and there are both positive and negative implications to political ambition. 
While it is easy to criticize politicians for doing things solely to satisfy their personal 
ambitions, we can also argue that ambition is a requisite for a true representative 
democracy. 
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Moreover, as will become clear later in this chapter, knowing to what extent running 
for president reduces the time that senators spend in Washington is instrumental to 
analyzing the extent to which running for president affects the contenders’ roll call 
voting as measured by W-NOMINATE scores. 
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4.2 Roll Call Voting 
Table 4.2 W-NOMINATE Scores per Congress 
Name  Party EY* #** Time period 91 SE 92 SE 93 SE 94 SE 
Birch E. Bayh, Indiana D 1976 94 Jan. 3, 1975 -0,621 0,029 -0,784 0,032 -0,668 0,061 -0,774 0,05 
Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr., Texas D     -Jan. 3, 1977     0,001 0,047 -0,118 0,038 -0,032 0,054 
Robert C. Byrd, West Virginia D       0,063 0,053 -0,007 0,041 -0,161 0,025 -0,165 0,053 
Frank Church, Idaho D       -0,508 0,075 -0,576 0,076 -0,641 0,056 -0,502 0,071 
Henry M. Jackson, Washington D       -0,296 0,045 -0,153 0,037 -0,398 0,037 -0,523 0,064 
Democratic Party D       -0,257   -0,394   -0,535   -0,447   
Republican Party R       0,503   0,28   0,339   0,3   
    1980 96 Jan. 3, 1979 93   94   95   96   
        -Jan. 3, 1981                 
Howard H. Baker, Jr., Tennessee R       0,375 0,031 0,274 0,072 0,184 0,042 0,313 0,08 
Robert J. Dole, Kansas R       0,356 0,029 0,334 0,045 0,412 0,071 0,313 0,043 
Edward M. Kennedy, Massachusetts D       -0,928 0,052 -0,904 0,069 -1 0,026 -1 0,091 
Democratic Party D       -0,535   -0,447   -0,515   0,483   
Republican Party R       0,339   0,3   0,349   0,306   
    1984 98 Jan. 3, 1983 95   96   97   98   
        -Jan. 3, 1985                 
Alan M. Cranston, California D       -0,584 0,094 -0,809 0,076 -0,881 0,089 -0,944 0,073 
John H. Glenn, Jr., Ohio  D       -0,245 0,045 -0,476 0,067 -0,408 0,091 -0,595 0,075 
Gary W. Hart, Colorado D       -0,548 0,036 -0,485 0,065 -0,761 0,065 -0,886 0,071 
Ernest F. Hollings, South Carolina D       -0,222 0,076 -0,112 0,065 -0,23 0,095 -0,574 0,04 
Democratic Party D       -0,515   0,483   -0,435   -0,627   
Republican Party R       0,349   0,306   0,557   0,395   
    1988 100 Jan. 3, 1987 97   98   99   100   
        -Jan. 3, 1989                 
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Joseph R. Biden, Delaware D       -0,574 0,115 -0,713 0,098 -0,676 0,039 -0,724 0,107 
Robert J. Dole, Kansas R       0,618 0,066 0,44 0,147 0,426 0,134 0,294 0,133 
Albert Gore, Jr., Tennessee D               -0,632 0,048 -0,785 0,064 
Paul M. Simon, Illinois D               -0,813 0,071 -0,969 0,054 
Democratic Party D       -0,435   -0,627   -0,591   -0,634   
Republican Party R       0,557   0,395   0,318   0,294   
    1992 102 Jan. 3, 1991 99   100   101   102   
        -Jan. 3, 1993                 
Tom Harkin, Iowa D       -0,959 0,042 -0,836 0,033 -0,673 0,112 -0,976 0,071 
J. Robert (Bob) Kerrey, Nebreska D               -0,543 0,083 -0,581 0,067 
Democratic Party D       -0,591   -0,634   -0,561   -0,553   
Republican Party R       0,318   0,294   0,386   0,381   
    1996 104 Jan. 3, 1995 101   102   103   104   
        -Jan. 3, 1997                 
Robert J. Dole, Kansas R       0,461 0,057 0,464 0,148 0,452 0,143 0,675 0,049 
William P. Gramm, Texas R       0,611 0,036 0,628 0,152 0,58 0,116 0,929 0,053 
Richard G. Lugar, Indiana R       0,386 0,073 0,349 0,15 0,239 0,148 0,479 0,146 
Arlen Specter, Pennsylvania R       0 0,045 -0,087 0,118 -0,025 0,114 -0,041 0,192 
Democratic Party D       -0,561   -0,553   -0,655   -0,779   
Republican Party R       0,386   0,381   0,33   0,578   
    2000 106 Jan. 3, 1999 103   104   105   106   
        -Jan. 3, 2001                 
Orrin G. Hatch, Utah R       0,414 0,133 0,609 0,117 0,425 0,109 0,535 0,109 
Joe Lieberman, Connecticut D       -0,487 0,058 -0,558 0,048 -0,52 0,098 -0,723 0,102 
John McCain, Arizona R       0,478 0,122 0,752 0,063 0,448 0,127 0,543 0,115 
Robert C. Smith, New Hampshire R       0,886 0,082 0,919 0,027 0,975 0,089 1 0,058 
Democratic Party D       -0,655   -0,779   -0,724   -0,593   
Republican Party R       0,33   0,578   0,473   0,659   
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    2004 108 Jan. 3, 2003 105   106   107   108   
        -Jan. 3, 2005                 
John Edwards, North Carolina D           -0,804 0,109 -0,557 0,088 -0,891 0,083 
Bob Graham, Florida D       -0,53 0,093 -0,774 0,088 -0,59 0,062 -0,887 0,088 
John Kerry, Massachusetts  D       -0,815 0,142 -0,836 0,11 -0,742 0,056 -0,954 0,083 
Joe Lieberman, Connecticut D       -0,52 0,098 -0,723 0,102 -0,622 0,08 -0,684 0,026 
Democratic Party D       -0,724   -0,593   -0,641   -0,747   
Republican Party R       0,473   0,659   0,616   0,763   
     
              
 * Election Year 
    
              
 ** Number of Congress 
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As the data in table 4.2 show, most contenders’ W-NOMINATE scores change in the 
predicted direction during the inter-election period. However, the party medians for 
W-NOMINATE scores are far from as stable as the party medians for attendance. 
Moreover, the data in table 4.2 also show that the contenders’ tendency to move left or 
right on Senate votes as the election nears is not equally pronounced for everyone, nor 
is it equally pronounced throughout the period observed. 
  
Data for the 1976 election reveal an inconsistent pattern. Two of the five Democratic 
contenders seemingly move to the left on Senate votes during the inter-election period 
leading up to the election in which they ran, two seemingly move to the middle, and 
one seemingly does not move at all. However, for the two contenders who seemingly 
move to the left, the findings are pronounced. In the 93rd Congress, Senator Bayh and 
Jackson’s W-NOMINATE scores (hereafter simply scores) were -0.668 and -0.398, 
respectively. In the 94th Congress, they were -0.774 and -0.523, indicating a move to 
the left. Senator Bentsen and Church’s scores, on the other hand, change from -0.118 
and -0.641 in the 93rd Congress to -0.032 and -0.502 in the 94th, indicating that 
contrary to expectations, they move to the middle on Senate votes. Senator Byrd’s 
scores hardly change during the inter-election period, indicating he does not move on 
Senate votes, at least not noticeably. 
 
Data for the 1980 election also reveal an inconsistent pattern, with the two Republican 
contenders and the one Democratic contender each exhibiting unique voting patterns. 
Republican Senator Baker is the only one whose scores are consistent with 
expectations. Republican Senator Dole moves by 0.101 points but in the opposite 
direction of what is expected. Democratic Senator Kennedy seemingly does not move 
at all on Senate votes during the inter-election period, receiving instead a perfect score 
of -1 in both the 95th and the 96th Congresses, indicating a consistent, ultra-liberal 
voting pattern. This is not perfectly consistent with expectations, but Kennedy’s lack 
of change is not at odds with expectations either insofar that he can not move farther to 
the left than he already has done. 
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Data for the 1984 election, on the contrary, do not only reveal a consistent pattern but 
also reveal a pronounced tendency to move on Senate votes. For all contenders, 
noticeable alterations in voting patterns are registered. In fact, three of the four 
Democratic contenders who ran in the 1984 election move more than -0.100 points. 
The largest move is registered for Senator Hollings who moves -0.344 points, 
indicating a considerable leftward move. 
 
Data for the 1988 election reveals a consistent pattern with one exception. Almost all 
contenders’ moves on Senate votes are in the expected direction. Again, as was the 
case for the 1980 election, Senator Dole represents the exception. His scores for the 
1984-1988 inter-election period indicate that he moves to the middle of the liberal-
conservative spectrum in the inter-election period, a finding at odds with expectations. 
In the 99th Congress, his score was 0.426; during the inter-election period it changes to 
0.294, indicating a quite considerable move to the middle. The moves in the expected 
direction are also, with one exception, quite considerable. Senators Gore and Simon 
move -0.153 points and -0.156 points, respectively, indicating a considerable move 
leftwards, whereas Senator Biden moves -0.048 points, indicating a noticeable, but 
less considerable move leftwards.  
 
Data for the 1992 election reveal a consistent pattern. There is, however, considerable 
difference in terms of the strength of the findings. Whereas Senator Harkin moves 
leftward by -0.303 points, Senator Kerrey hardly moves at all, moving only by -0.038.   
 
Data for the 1996 election reveal a consistent pattern with one exception. Republican 
Senator Specter, who according to the prediction should move to the right, instead 
moves to the left. Indeed, he not only moves to the left on the Republican side of the 
spectrum, but also, his scores show, he voted with liberals on several issues in the 
inter-election period. The alterations registered for Specter, however, are small, 
indicating a relatively stable voting pattern. Generally, in terms of strength, the 
tendency of contenders from the Senate to move to the extremes of the liberal-
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conservative spectrum is quite pronounced. For all but Senator Specter, noticeable 
alterations in voting patterns in the expected direction are registered, the largest 
alteration being represented by Senator Gramm’s scores which were 0.58 in the 103rd 
Congress and 0.929 in the 104th, indicating a considerable move rightwards. 
  
Data for the 2000 election reveal a perfectly consistent pattern. For all contenders, 
alterations in voting patterns are registered, and they are all in the expected direction. 
However, the tendency to move on Senate votes as Election Day approaches is not 
equally pronounced across contenders. Moreover, the difference in degree of change is 
considerable between the contender who changes the least and the contender who 
changes the most. Senator Lieberman’s score changes from -0.520 in the 105th 
Congress to -0.723 in the 106th, whereas Senator Smith’s score changes only slightly, 
from 0.975 in the 105th Congress to a perfect score of one in the 106th Congress, 
indicating he hardly moves at all on Senate votes, but instead votes consistently ultra-
conservative throughout the period. As was the case with Senator Kennedy in 1980, 
this is not perfectly consistent with expectations, but Smith’s lack of change is not at 
odds with expectations either insofar that he can not move farther to the right than he 
already has done. 
  
Data for the 2004 election reveal a similar pattern, consistent and with pronounced 
findings for all but one contender. Senator Lieberman’s scores for the inter-election 
period beginning in 2000 indicate that he hardly moved at all on Senate votes. This is 
one of the most interesting findings for this period given that Senator Lieberman 
moved quite far leftwards during the inter-election period beginning in 1996. Indeed, 
as outlined above, Senator Lieberman’s move leftwards was the largest move 
registered among the contenders in the 2000 election. Generally, the findings for the 
2004 election are the most pronounced for the entire period observed with moves 
exceeding -0.334 points (Senator Edwards). Indeed, with the exception of Senator 
Lieberman, none of the contenders move less than -0.212 points. 
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As in the previous analysis on attendance, the time of observation was expanded to 
eight years to see if this expanded observation period changed the picture (Is 
movement to the extremes of the liberal-conservative spectrum in fact associated with 
the decision to run for president, or do alterations in voting patterns seemingly occur 
arbitrarily?) Also as in the previous analysis, this expanded observation revealed a 
more nuanced picture, more specifically four tendencies which are briefly outlined 
below. 
 
The most pronounced tendency is the tendency to become more liberal from the first 
Congress (of the four Congresses for which data are collected) to the second, then less 
liberal from the second to the third, and then more liberal from the third to the fourth. 
The second most pronounced tendency is the tendency to become more conservative 
from the first Congress to the second, then less conservative from the second to the 
third, and then more conservative from the third to the fourth.13
                                              
 
13 This must be seen in connection with the fact that mostly Democratic senators ran for President between 1976 
and 2004. Of the 27 senators observed, 19 were Democrats. This predominance of Democrats in turn reflects the 
fact that from 1977 to 2005 there were three Republican presidents of whom all ran for a second term, thus 
naturally reducing the number of Republican contenders. 
 The peaks dovetail 
with presidential elections. Senators observed become more extreme (and lose more 
votes) in Congresses of election years long before they are contenders themselves. 
Therefore, one could ask whether senators generally become more extreme in election 
years or if this tendency is particular to the senators observed, indicating that they start 
as early as eight years prior to an election to tailor their behavior. Comparisons of 
contenders with their colleagues, or more precisely, with the party medians for the 
Congresses, for which data are collected, indicate that this is the case to some extent. 
The tendency of the parties as a whole to become more extreme in an election year is, 
however, generally less pronounced than the tendency of the senators observed, 
perhaps suggesting that senators begin to tailor their roll call voting to appeal to the 
desired electorates as early as eight years prior to an election. 
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The key point from the section above is that expanding the time of observation reveals 
a more complex pattern regarding the contenders’ tendency to move on Senate votes 
prior to and during running for president, but the position shifting does not seem to be 
arbitrary given that most senators observed seem to behave similarly, but differently 
from others in their respective parties. Although there are contenders whose voting 
patterns do not fit any of the descriptions above, it seems safe to say that alterations in 
voting patterns do not occur arbitrarily, given the historical data. Moreover, patterns 
revealed by expanding the observation to eight years point to the likelihood of 
senators’ starting as early as eight years prior to an election to tailor their behavior, 
given that they start to become more extreme as early as during the inter-election 
periods prior to the inter-election periods leading up to the elections in which they run. 
 
4.2.1 Summary of Findings for Roll Call Voting 
As the data in table 4.2 indicate, the decision to run for president seems to affect 
contenders’ roll call voting. Almost all contenders seem to move to the left or right 
(depending on their political affiliation) on Senate votes during the pertinent inter-
election periods. The party medians indicate, however, that the effect is less dramatic 
than expected, as they too move, although not to the extent that most contenders do. 
 
However, the data reveals variations among the progressively ambitious that need 
mention. Despite the overall tendency apparent in the data set, a closer look at the 
comparisons presented above of contenders with their colleagues reveals different 
patterns among contenders. Some contenders move considerably during the inter-
election period, while other contenders hardly move at all, while others’ again move, 
but in the wrong direction. As in the analysis on attendance, one of the most 
interesting findings pertains to Senators Dole and Kerry, the only ones to be nominated 
by their parties in the period observed. Whereas Senator Dole, contrary to 
expectations, moves toward the middle of the liberal-conservative spectrum, Senator 
Kerry moves very far leftwards. However, the number of contenders whose voting 
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records show movement to either left or right clearly outnumber those whose voting 
records hardly show movement at all. 
 
There is also considerable variation across decades. Particularly striking is the 
difference in the extent to which contenders seem to move on Senate votes between 
the 1976 election and the 2004 election. Whereas the 1976 election sees noticeable, 
but relatively small shifts in voting, the 2004 election sees considerable shifts in voting 
across all contenders except Senator Joe Lieberman. This hints at the polarization that 
has taken place in American politics both in government and in the electorate over the 
past 20 years. However, explanations as to why there are considerable shifts in voting 
among the progressively ambitious in the 2004 election as opposed to the 1976 
election are beyond the scope of the study. 
 
In Chapter 2 it was hypothesized that contenders’ voting records will show a 
movement to the extremes of the liberal-conservative spectrum during the inter-
election period. The findings presented above provide support for this hypothesis. 
Although the patterns for individual contenders vary, data regarding roll call voting are 
generally consistent with this hypothesis. This, in turn, provides support for ambition 
theory. Particularly the material presented in the analysis of individual senators 
indicates that their presidential ambition affected their legislative behavior.  
 
4.3 Discussion 
As tables 1 and 2 make clear, contenders alter their behavior in terms of attendance 
and roll call voting during of the inter-election period leading up to the election in 
which they ran. Almost all the contenders miss more votes in the Congress of the 
Election Year and move to the extremes of the liberal-conservative spectrum during 
this period. This is consistent with the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 2. However, 
evaluating a theory consists of more than just deriving and testing hypotheses and 
commenting on the results. To evaluate a theory one also has to consider alternative 
explanations to the findings. This is what the following discussion does. It starts out 
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with a discussion of possible methodological explanations, then proceeds to substantial 
explanations. More specifically, it assesses the validity of the measures of ambition 
and legislative behavior, the extent to which the estimated W-NOMINATE scores are 
reliable and free of bias, and whether the data allow for generalizations beyond the 
period of time and institutional setting studied. 
 
Following the lead of others (Hibbing 1986; Herrick and Moore 1993), this study uses 
the actual decision to seek a higher office as a surrogate measure for ambition. (More 
specifically, it uses the official declaration of candidacy for the Presidency as a 
measure for progressive ambition.) Lacking psychological profiles of elected officials, 
using the actual decision to seek a higher office is one approach to measuring 
ambition. However, by using this approach, there is a possibility that the effect of 
ambition is either overestimated or underestimated. It may be overestimated because 
senators may decide to run for president for reasons other than ambition, 
underestimated because senators may harbor presidential ambition but never declare 
their candidacies. 
 
The effect of ambition may be overestimated because there may be ulterior motives 
behind a senator’s decision to run for president. He or she may decide to run to keep 
someone else from running, to support another candidate or to gain attention for a 
cause. However, running for president is such a rigorous endeavor that it is unlikely 
many decide to run for president for strategic reasons only. It is particularly unlikely 
for senators given the demands of their current office. 
 
The effect of ambition may be underestimated because presidential ambition may be 
possessed by many who never actually run for president. There are many reasons why 
potential contenders would eventually refrain from deciding to run, but the demands of 
the contemporary nomination process in terms of money is one possible explanation. 
A second explanation may be lack of sufficient support within the party in the early 
stages. Other explanations may be related to constituency and individual factors. 
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Whereas it is unlikely many decide to run for president for strategic reasons only, it is 
likely some harbor presidential ambition, but never make it farther than the initial 
stages of the presidential election process. 
 
In theory, by using the actual decision to run for president as a measure for presidential 
ambition, there is a possibility of treating senators who decide to run for president for 
strategic reasons, as having presidential ambition, thus potentially wrongfully inferring 
an effect of ambition. There is also a possibility of treating senators who do not run for 
president as not having such ambition while in fact they do, thus wrongfully not 
inferring an effect of ambition. However, while acknowledging the fact that using this 
measure may either overestimate or underestimate the effect of ambition, it should be 
safe to say that the decision to run for president provides a measure of presidential 
ambition that adequately serves the purposes of this study.  
 
To describe contenders’ voting positions, this study relies on the concept of political 
ideology. To measure contenders’ voting positions, the study employs W-
NOMINATE scores which are estimated from the contenders’ decisions on roll calls. 
The intuition underlying statistical models of legislative voting such as that underlying 
NOMINATE is that each roll call present each legislator with a choice between a 
“yea” and a “nay” position. Legislators are presumed to vote for the position most 
similar to their own ideal policy position (Clinton et al 2004: 807). Underlying 
NOMINATE is also an assumption that voting is fundamentally driven by one basic 
dimension, the liberal conservative dimension (Poole 1999:3).  
 
Studies of congressional roll call voting have frequently employed W-NOMINATE 
scores and alternative versions of NOMINATE scores as dependent variables ( e.g. 
Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Bartels 2002; Griffin and Newman 2004). 
Moreover, as a practical matter, W-NOMINATE scores are highly correlated with 
alternative, summary measures of legislator roll call behavior such as interest group 
ratings and Heckman-Snyder scores (Burden, Caldeira, and Groseclose 2000). 
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However, as pointed out by Clinton et al (2004: 806),  
 
the legislator’s decision on any analyzed vote may well have been influenced by party 
pressure, presidential pressure, and/or lobbying by interest groups, and is not a perfect 
reflection of the legislator’s ideology.    
 
Without considerable more data, the effects of these plausible sources can not be 
ascertained. Therefore, voting scores estimated from roll calls should not be literally 
treated as a measure of a senator’s personal ideology, but rather as a mix of these 
possible influences on roll call voting (Clinton et al 2004: 807). 
 
Even if W-NOMINATE scores are not perfect reflections of legislator’s ideology, they 
may still serve as useful summaries of the ideological content of legislators’ voting 
records (Clinton et al 2004: 807). In any event, they provide an easily understood and 
easily communicated basis for assessing whether senators move on Senate votes as 
they approach a bid for the Presidency.      
 
As tables 1 and 2 show, decisions to run for president is strongly associated with 
alterations in behavior in terms of attendance and roll call voting. For most senators, 
considerable increases in percentage of missed votes are registered. Most senators also 
move toward the extremes of the liberal-conservative spectrum. More specifically, 
most senators’ W-NOMINATE scores change considerably, with some senators’ score 
moving as much as -0.433 (Senator Hollings, 1984).  
 
As indicated in Chapter 2, section 2.2, and in Chapter 3, section 3.3.3 scoring 
legislators’ voting records (and then using them in subsequent analysis) is not without 
its problems. Estimating voting scores for incumbent legislators running for president 
is particularly difficult. Campaigning takes these legislators away from Washington, 
generating, as demonstrated in table 4.1, considerably high rates of abstention in their 
voting records in the run up to an election. This problem is enlarged by the fact that 
most roll calls drawing candidates back to Washington to cast votes are not a random 
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subset of roll calls, but are on issues where the legislators’ votes might have utmost 
importance for procedural reasons. Party loyalty rather than a genuine ideological 
position might explain some of these votes (Clinton et al 2004: 809). This situation 
could lead to wrongful interpretations of the legislators’ W-NOMINATE scores. 
However, by accounting for uncertainty and estimating W-NOMINATE scores per 
Congress rather than for shorter periods of time (thus from more votes), this problem 
is largely dealt with.       
 
To evaluate ambition theory, this study looks at all senators who ran for president from 
1976 to 2004, the total of which is 27. Strictly speaking, the results can not be used to 
generalize about the interplay between progressive ambition and legislative behavior 
beyond this period in time or in other institutional settings. Given that the senators do 
not constitute a random sample, it is not possible to generalize with a set amount of 
uncertainty that the results for the senators examined hold true for all progressively 
ambitious senators, let alone all progressively ambitious politicians. 
 
However, the contender group consists of both Democratic and Republicans, junior 
and senior senators, from all four major regions in the United States. There is not 
reason to believe that they differ systematically from their colleagues in terms of 
personal and constituency attributes. Moreover, twenty-eight years is a long time span 
over which many sorts of idiosyncrasies should iron out. Generalizations accordingly 
gain strength. 
 
Two dependent variables were set out as focal points for the inquiry: Attendance and 
roll call voting. Clearly, these variables represent only a very small slice of legislative 
behavior. Legislative activities also include bill introduction, co-sponsorship, 
legislative generalization, and legislative specialization to name a few. In addition to 
these quantifiable types of activities, there are floor activities, such as speeches and 
special orders, or major floor amendments, often receiving more press, weighing more 
heavily with attentive outside groups, and having a greater effect on policy outcomes 
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than does mere introduction of legislation. In addition to these overt activities, there 
are behind-the scenes efforts to mobilize support for legislative proposals, work out 
compromises on pending matters, and the like (Lubalin 1981: 113-114). 
 
The findings for both attendance and roll call voting are mostly consistent and strong, 
although more so for attendance than roll call voting. In consistence with the 
hypotheses, these findings support ambition theory. However, there is a possibility that 
attendance and roll call voting are not representative of legislative activities as a 
whole, limiting the ability to generalize about the effect of ambition on legislative 
behavior. Using for instance bill introduction and co-sponsorship may yield different 
results, thus devaluating ambition theory. This possibility should be taken into 
consideration in future research on the ambition-behavior relationship. 
 
Recognizing the possibility that using other dependent variables may produce other 
results, a strong case on behalf of ambition theory’s ability to explain legislative 
behavior can still be made. First, this study uses two measures for legislative behavior. 
Second, the results for both attendance and roll call voting prove supportive of the 
hypotheses, although less so for attendance. While not ruling out the possibility that 
using other dependent variables may yield other results, these findings strengthen the 
ability to make inferences about the effect of ambition on legislative behavior. 
 
This discussion has sought to critically review the study to assess to what extent 
choices made regarding research design have had an effect on the results. None of the 
variables are ideal, but the measures used are found adequate for the purposes of this 
study. Using the actual decision to run for president as a surrogate for contenders’ 
psychological predisposition to seek the Presidency, assumed to exist prior to their 
legislative activity, provides for an adequate measure of ambition in the absence of 
psychological profiles. Using contenders’ PMV and W-NOMINATE scores as 
measures of attendance and roll call voting, respectively, makes attendance and 
contenders voting positions amenable for quantitative analysis, but simplicity has its 
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costs. Focusing on senators running for president from 1976 to 2004 and attendance 
and roll call voting limits the ability to generalize about the findings. However, roll 
call voting constitutes one of the most substantive activities senators perform (Griffin 
and Newman 2004: 9) and assessing the extent to which senators move on roll call 
votes provides a way of ascertaining whether ambition has an effect on ambition.   
 
In sum, then, the results of the analysis strengthen the hypotheses stated in chapter 2. 
One, during the inter-election period, it is expected that contenders’ attendance will 
decline.  Two, it is expected that contenders’ voting records will show a movement to 
the extremes of the liberal-conservative spectrum as the primary season approaches. 
The validation of the hypotheses, in turn, strengthens the case made on behalf of 
ambition theory. Various types of ambition give rise to different types of behavior. 
 
However, the variations among the contenders examined suggest a need to take 
individual campaign strategies and other mediating variables into account when 
attempting to develop generalizations about the effect of progressive ambition on 
behavior. To take account of subsets of politically meaningful variables associated 
with Senate incumbency14
According to Lubalin (1981: 968-969), constituency and individual factors may help 
explain differences in, for instance, Senators Bayh and Bentsen’s voting patterns. 
Through extensive case studies, she finds that during their candidacies, both senators 
 and presidential contesting, Lubalin (1981) advances a 
refinement to ambition theory, as presented by Joseph Schlesinger. This refinement 
suggests that the ability of ambition theory to explain the responses adopted by diverse 
political actors to similar office goals can be enhanced by examining the mediating 
role of five variables: 1) constituency factors; 2) institutional factors; 3) policy factors; 
4) individual factors; and 5) campaign factors. 
 
                                              
 
14 ’Incumbent’ refers to a person who holds a particular office or position; ‘incumbancy’ to the office, duty, or 
tenure of an incumbent. 
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moved on Senate votes, contradicting votes they had recorded earlier, or put a different 
cast on issues in their national campaigns than they had previously put on such issues 
in their home-state senatorial campaigns. Occasionally, each also adopted a position 
on new issues that was more in line with their national campaign needs than with their 
constituents’ views. These moves tended to take place on very salient issues, or on 
policies of special importance to selected groups who were influential in the 
nomination process. However, Bentsen was less likely to make such moves than Bayh. 
As his Senate re-election approached, he became even less likely to do so.  
 
Lubalin (1981: 968-969) suggests that the difference in the behavior of the two 
senators results from a combination of constituency and individual factors. Bayh’s 
progressively more liberal voting record was damaging to him in Indiana, just as 
Bentsen’s move to the left in 1973 and 1974 hurt him in Texas. However, in Bentsen’s 
case, the ramifications of voting “against Texas” were more severe because of the 
coincidence of his Senate and presidential races. With four years separating his 1976 
presidential race and 1980 Senate re-election campaign, Bayh was not under the same 
kind of immediate, intense constituent pressure as Bentsen was. 
 
The research design adopted in this study does not allow for an exploration of this 
explanation. The study has, however, found that senators with progressive ambition 
behave noticeably different from their less ambitious colleagues in terms of attendance 
and roll call voting, measured using percentage of missed votes and W-NOMINATE 
scores, respectively. The findings, moreover, are mostly consistent and strong, 
strengthening the proposition that ambition affects legislative behavior. The extent to 
which constituency and individual factors mediate the effect of ambition on legislative 
behavior is left for future research.  
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5.0 Conclusion 
This study was undertaken to assess whether an ambition-based approach to politics 
can contribute to the understanding of legislative behavior.  More specifically, the 
study has examined the effect of ambition on United States senators who ran for 
president from 1976 to 2004. The United States Senate was selected as a focus for the 
inquiry on both substantial and methodological grounds. A quantitative analytical 
technique was employed in exploring the effect of presidential ambition on legislative 
behavior.  
 
Data presented in this study provide support for the hypothesis that ambition for higher 
office has a marked effect on legislative behavior. In most instances examined here, 
the presidential candidacies had a pronounced effect on behavior in the Senate during 
the period in which the presidential nomination was sought.  
 
Of the two dependent variables examined, the findings are strongest and most 
consistent for attendance. In most cases, interest in the Presidency led to a drop in 
Senate contenders’ attendance, or more specifically to an increase in their PMV. The 
effect of ambition on contenders’ roll call voting is also noticeable—considerable for 
some—but the overall effect is not as dramatic as it was expected to be. 
 
The variations among the progressively ambitious senators may be explained by five 
mediating variables—constituency, institutional, policy, individual and campaign 
factors. These mediating variables may provide politically meaningful and plausible 
explanations for the major variations in legislative behavior apparent among the 
contenders during their pursuit of the presidential nomination. As the research design 
did not allow for an exploration of this possibility, it is left for future research.  
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Appendix 
R - Codes15
                                              
 
15 Thanks to Bjørn Høyland for valuable help regarding these R-codes. 
 
 
############# 
# Wnominate   # 
############# 
 
sen91 <-readKH("ftp://voteview.com/sen91kh.ord") 
summary(sen91,verbose=TRUE) 
result<-wnominate(sen91,polarity="THURMOND (R SC)",dims=1, trials=5) 
summary(result,verbose=TRUE) 
 
rm(list=ls()) 
library(wnominate) 
senDat <- readKH("ftp://voteview.com/sen91kh.ord") 
senData <- dropRollCall(senDat, 
 dropList=list(lop=3,dropList=list(legisMin=25))) 
senInfo <- summary(senData,verbose=TRUE) 
senResults <- wnominate(senData,dims=1,polarity="THURMOND (R SC)",trials=5) 
senResults$legislators 
senResults$legislators[,13:14] 
Info <- merge(senInfo$legisTab,senResults$legislators,by="row.names")  
Info <- cbind(senInfo$legisTab[-1,],senResults$legislators[-1,])  
MeanMissingVotesDemo <- mean(Info[,10][Info$party=="D"],na.rm=TRUE) 
MeanMissingVotesRep <- mean(Info[,10][Info$party=="R"],na.rm=TRUE)  
MedianMissingVotesDemo <- median(Info[,10][Info$party=="D"],na.rm=TRUE) 
MedianMissingVotesRep <- median(Info[,10][Info$party=="R"],na.rm=TRUE)  
MeanMissingVotesDemo 
MeanMissingVotesRep 
MedianMissingVotesDemo 
MedianMissingVotesRep 
############## 
MeanNominDemo <- mean(Info$coord1D[Info$party=="D"],na.rm=TRUE) 
MeanNominRep <- mean(Info$coord1D[Info$party=="R"],na.rm=TRUE)  
MedianNominDemo <- median(Info$coord1D[Info$party=="D"],na.rm=TRUE) 
MedianNominRep <- median(Info$coord1D[Info$party=="R"],na.rm=TRUE) 
MeanNominDemo 
MeanNominRep 
MedianNominDemo 
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MedianNominRep 
 
 
#Polarities used 
# Sen91 THURMOND (R SC) 
# Sen92 GOLDWATER (R AZ) 
# Sen93 FANNIN (R WY) 
# Sen94 GOLDWATER (R AZ) 
# Sen95 SCOTT (R VA) 
# Sen96 HUMPHREY (R NH) 
# Sen97 GOLDWATER (R AZ) 
# Sen98 SYMMS (R ID) 
# Sen99 WALLOP (R WY) 
# Sen100 SYMMS (R ID)  
# Sen101 SYMMS (R ID) 
# Sen102 HELMS (R NC) 
# Sen103 HELMS (R NC) 
# Sen104 KYL (R AZ) 
# Sen105 HELMS (R NC) 
# Sen106 GRAMM (R TX) 
# Sen107 GRAMM (R TX) 
# Sen108  THOMAS (R WY) 
 
